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  INTRODUCTION   
We live in an “administrative state.”1 Civil servants and po-
litical appointees make rules of general applicability, adjudicate 
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 1. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, J., dis-
senting) (“[T]he danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state 
cannot be dismissed.”); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 
561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010) (“The growth of the Executive Branch . . . heightens 
the concern that it may slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from that of 
the people. This concern is largely absent from the dissent’s paean to the ad-
ministrative state.”); Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 
755 (2002) (“The Framers, who envisioned a limited Federal Government, could 
not have anticipated the vast growth of the administrative state.”). See gener-
ally JERRY MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 12 (1985) (“It 
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individual cases, and enforce the laws within complex, hierar-
chical organizations. At the same time, we are committed to 
democratic-constitutional principles, which require that “We the 
people” remain the authors of the laws that bind us.2 Bureau-
cracy can serve democratic governance because the public pur-
poses outlined by statute often require “administrative machin-
ery” to come into force.3 But democracy is also seen to conflict 
with the delegation of discretionary authority to administrative 
institutions, since bureaucratic decision-makers stand removed 
from electoral accountability.4 
The latest doctrinal expression of this conflicted partnership 
between democracy and bureaucracy is the major questions doc-
trine.5 This doctrine is a prominent exception to the general 
principle of judicial deference to administrative interpretations 
of statutory ambiguities.6 Courts will normally afford agency in-
 
is not only trite, it is no longer sufficient to say that we have a cradle-to-grave 
administrative, welfare state. Administrators make decisions that affect us 
from before the cradle to beyond the grave.”); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and 
the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1983) (“[A] conception of pub-
lic administration free from judicial oversight would have damaged the funda-
mental political axiom of limited government and thus undermined in advance 
a principal buttress for the legitimacy of the modern ‘administrative state.’”). 
 2. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 3. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 263 (1918) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). 
 4. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW 131–34 (1980) (“The point is not that such ‘faceless bureaucrats’ 
necessarily do a bad job as our effective legislators. It is rather that they are 
neither elected nor reelected . . . .”); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERAL-
ISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 289–300 (2d ed. 1979); WIL-
LIAM SCHEUERMAN, BETWEEN THE NORM AND THE EXCEPTION: THE FRANKFURT 
SCHOOL AND THE RULE OF LAW 1–3 (1994) (“If state action is to be rendered 
normatively legitimate, many of the giants of modern political thought argue, 
we need to make sure that law takes a form capable of carefully regulating bu-
reaucrats. . . . Poorly constrained state action undermines political and social 
autonomy.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpre-
tation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delega-
tion, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 990–95 (2013) (“[T]he major 
questions doctrine [has] been described as ‘Marbury’s revenge,’ an effort to re-
claim some of the judicial power that Chevron shifted to agencies.”); Cass Sun-
stein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 236–45 (2006) (discussing the de-
velopment of the major questions principle and the conflicting opinions on the 
proper authority for and application of the doctrine). 
 6. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (“If Congress 
has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of 
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terpretations of such ambiguities some degree of weight or def-
erence, depending on the level of authority Congress has dele-
gated to the agency and the formality of the procedure through 
which such interpretations have been issued.7 However, in a se-
ries of cases in the past three decades, the Supreme Court has 
held that where a statutory ambiguity raises a question of great 
“economic and political significance,” it will presume that Con-
gress did not intend the agency to resolve the issue.8 Instead, the 
Court will resolve the ambiguity itself, without giving any 
weight or deference to the agency’s position.9 
The major questions doctrine has played a key role in recent, 
high-profile cases. In King v. Burwell,10 the Supreme Court re-
fused to defer to the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) interpre-
tation of the Affordable Care Act’s provision of tax credits for 
health insurance purchased through “an Exchange established 
by the State.”11 The Court noted that this provision was “among 
the Act’s key reforms, involving billions of dollars” and affecting 
the health insurance coverage of millions of Americans.12 The 
interpretation of this provision therefore raised questions of such 
“deep economic and political significance,” that the Court pre-
sumed Congress did not intend the IRS to resolve them.13 “This 
is not a case for the IRS. It is instead our task to determine the 
 
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regu-
lation.”); Gluck & Schultz Bressman, supra note 5, at 990 (“[T]he major ques-
tions doctrine presumes that Congress does not intend to delegate interpretive 
authority over major policy questions to an agency, even if it leaves a statutory 
ambiguity.”). 
 7. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (holding 
that agency interpretations are entitled to “Chevron deference when it appears 
that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carry-
ing the force of law”); id. at 234 (explaining further that some deference is still 
given to the agency interpretation, despite falling outside of Chevron deference, 
in proportion to the agency’s “specialized experience and broader investigations 
and information”). 
 8. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. 
v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 147 (2000). 
 9. E.g., King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. 
 10. Id. 
 11. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012); King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (refusing to 
defer to the IRS’s interpretation because of the major question implicated by the 
statutory ambiguity). 
 12. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. 
 13. Id. 
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correct reading . . . .”14 
In Texas v. United States,15 the Fifth Circuit likewise found 
that the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Deferred Ac-
tion for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents 
(DAPA) program was likely unlawful, in part, because it “un-
doubtedly implicates question[s] of ‘deep economic and political 
significance.’”16 If Congress had wished to give DHS authority to 
defer removal proceedings for over four million undocumented 
immigrants, “it surely would have done so expressly.”17   
These cases show that, in spite of its relatively spare use to 
date,18 the major questions doctrine has significant implications 
for both social policy and constitutional structure. The doctrine 
channels constitutional power by reserving to the judiciary, ra-
ther than the executive, authority to settle questions that statu-
tory law has left unresolved. Because the doctrine is triggered by 
a court’s perception that the interpretive question at issue is po-
litically salient, it authorizes judicial policymaking on precisely 
those issues that have the highest visibility for the American 
public. The doctrine therefore licenses judicial intervention in 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. 809 F.3d. 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff ’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. 
Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 16. Id. at 181 (quoting King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.  
 17. Id. 
 18. The major questions doctrine continues to be discussed and invoked in 
the lower courts. E.g., U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 382 (D.C. Cir. 
2017) (denying a rehearing en banc in challenge to the FCC’s “Open Internet 
Order,” where concurring and dissenting opinions joined issue on the applica-
tion of the major questions doctrine to the Order); ClearCorrect Operating, LLC 
v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (O’Malley, J., con-
curring) (rejecting the International Trade Commission’s interpretation of arti-
cles, under the Tariff Act of 1930, to encompass electronic transmissions of data, 
in part on the grounds that “[i]f Congress intended for the Commission to regu-
late one of the most important aspects of modern-day life, Congress surely 
would have said so expressly”); U.S. House of Reps. v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 
165, 188 (D.D.C. 2016) (withholding deference to the Treasury Department’s 
interpretation of the Affordable Care Act with regard to appropriations for sub-
sidies on the grounds that it was a major question and “[t]here was no express 
delegation here”); cf. Chamber of Commerce v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152, 
178–79 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (discussing major questions, but refusing to apply it, 
instead granting summary judgment for the Department of Labor in challenge 
to its “fiduciary rule,” and distinguishing major questions cases on the grounds 
that Congress had “clearly . . . assigned the DOL the power to regulate a signif-
icant portion of the American economy, which the DOL has done since the stat-
ute was enacted”). For a discussion and critique of major questions adjudication 
in the lower courts, see generally Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, 
Major Questions, 70 VAND. L. REV. 777 (2017). 
 2024 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:2019 
 
intensely political disputes. 
The major questions doctrine deserves close examination 
not only because it enlarges the judiciary’s policymaking power, 
but also because it succinctly encapsulates a deeply entrenched 
ideology of administrative law and bureaucratic legitimacy. The 
doctrine presumes that the reasonable legislator would not have 
wanted a bureaucratic body to settle policy questions that were 
left unanswered by statutory law.19 Administrative agencies, in 
this view, are treated as purely technocratic institutions, which 
are meant only to find the best means to achieve legislative 
goals.20 The courts, by contrast, are treated as the guardians of 
principle and policy, who stand ready to prevent over-zealous ex-
ecutive officials from usurping legislative power. These assump-
tions are rooted in an antibureaucratic philosophy of the modern 
state, which is visible in significant strands of scholarly litera-
ture and in some important case law.21 By reconstructing the ra-
tionale for the major questions doctrine, we can better under-
stand and assess the premises of this legal and political 
philosophy. 
The major questions doctrine is best explained as an at-
tempt to reinforce democratic-constitutional values. In practice, 
however, it undermines such values by failing to respect the de-
liberative capacities of administrative agencies. I present a Pro-
gressive understanding of the state that recognizes agencies’ 
democratic virtues. I then propose a modification to the major 
questions doctrine that would reinforce, rather than impair, 
agencies’ discursive and participatory functions. 
The jurisprudential foundation for the major questions doc-
trine is the constitutional principle that Congress may not dele-
gate policymaking authority to another actor without providing 
an “intelligible principle” to guide and constrain the exercise of 
that authority.22 This “nondelegation doctrine” protects legisla-
tive prerogatives by striking down statutes that do not ade-
quately delimit the exercise of administrative discretion. The 
major questions doctrine takes a less extreme approach. Instead 
of simply abrogating unconstitutionally broad grants of admin-
istrative authority, the major questions doctrine requires courts 
to interpret regulatory statutes so as to narrow the discretion 
 
 19. Gluck & Schultz Bressman, supra note 5, at 990. 
 20. See infra Part III.B. 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
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they allocate to administrative bodies. The judiciary can thus re-
spect Congress’s general legislative choice to intervene in a given 
policy area, but prevent administrative agencies from address-
ing fundamental political questions. 
The broader normative justification for the major questions 
doctrine is to reinforce democratic legitimacy. The doctrine pre-
sumes that democracy will be enhanced if administrative agen-
cies do not make important value choices.23 This presumption is 
based upon two auxiliary premises. The first premise, which can 
be traced to the great scholars of the Legal Process School, is that 
the courts are and should be the primary interpreters of the prin-
ciples and policies enacted in legislation.24 The second assump-
tion, which can be traced to Max Weber’s sociology of law, is that 
bureaucracy is and should be an efficient, neutral instrument for 
implementing goals established by statute.25   
I argue that these auxiliary premises are descriptively inac-
curate and normatively unappealing. As a descriptive matter, 
they fail to account for salient features of our current institu-
tional regime: that agencies do, in fact, often make important 
value choices, and that agencies’ procedural mechanisms and in-
stitutional position can promote deliberative, inclusive, and ra-
tional decision-making.26 As a normative matter, therefore, 
these premises fail to recognize that administrative policymak-
ing may increase, rather than detract from, the democratic legit-
imacy of state action. 
I present a Progressive theory of the administrative state 
that better captures this democracy-enhancing aspect of our ad-
ministrative procedure. I call this theory Progressive because it 
was authored by American Progressives like John Dewey, Wood-
row Wilson, and Frank Goodnow, who first advocated expansive 
national regulatory power in the United States.27 Such Progres-
sive conceptions of the American state have received renewed 
attention in recent years, not only from scholars who broadly 
support their vision of democratically authorized administrative 
 
 23. See infra Part I.B. 
 24. See infra Part III.A. 
 25. See infra Part III.B. 
 26. See infra Part V. 
 27. See infra Part IV.B. 
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regulation,28 but also from those who trace the decline of Amer-
ican constitutionalism to Progressivism.29 Legal scholarship, 
however, continues to operate under misapprehensions about 
the content and commitments of Progressivism, usually empha-
sizing only the Progressive concern with bureaucratic exper-
tise.30 This paper therefore reassesses the “original intent” of the 
Progressives to explain how the state can remain democratic, 
even when unelected bureaucrats make important policy 
choices. 
The Progressives followed the German philosopher G.W.F. 
Hegel in understanding the state as an institution that guaran-
tees individual and collective freedom through expert regulation 
and social-welfare provision.31 But, unlike Hegel, they argued 
that administration must be informed by public opinion.32 They 
believed that agencies could augment the popular legitimacy of 
the state by bringing the input of the affected parties to bear in 
crafting regulatory policy.33 They therefore advocated for a state 
that would maximize both deliberative engagement and pro-
grammatic efficiency. The institutional architecture of our ad-
ministrative state reflects significant aspects of the Progressive 
vision.34 
This Progressive theory of administration is capacious. It in-
corporates aspects of the other theories that have been advanced 
 
 28. See, e.g., K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination, Democracy, and Constitu-
tional Political Economy in the New Gilded Age: Towards a Fourth Wave of Le-
gal Realism?, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1337–45 (2016) (discussing Progressive Era 
political and legal thought as an intellectual foundation for using administra-
tion to combat social domination and promote democratic engagement). 
 29. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 
447–78 (2014) (identifying the American Progressives as originating our admin-
istrative law and disregarding constitutional principles of the rule of law and 
democratic control of policy decisions). 
 30. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 223–25 (1992) (discussing 
the development of “the Progressives’ increasing admiration of the professional 
expert whose skill, neutrality, and impartiality formed an alternative to both 
the demagoguery and corruption of American democratic politics and the un-
mitigated self-interest of marketplace ethics”). 
 31. See infra Part IV.A. 
 32. See infra Part IV.A. 
 33. See infra Part IV.B. 
 34. See infra Part IV. 
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to justify the administrative state, such as legislative democ-
racy,35 expertise,36 interest-group pluralism,37 civic republican-
ism,38 and presidentialism.39 But it situates and relativizes each 
of these theories within a general concept of the state. In the 
Progressive theory, the state is the institutional articulation of 
democratic discourse. This is a normative rather than merely de-
scriptive concept. The structures of the state should reflect, re-
fine, and ultimately enforce value commitments that emerge 
from an open and contested process of “political will-formation” 
in the public sphere.40 
Administrative agencies play a pivotal role within this state. 
Their function is not merely to carry out an already specified po-
litical program, but rather to incorporate the perspectives of 
multiple actors who possess partial democratic authority. Thus, 
while acknowledging the President’s role in overseeing adminis-
trative action, the Progressive theory insulates administrative 
decision-making from complete presidential control, so as to 
 
 35. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 40 (1982) (argu-
ing that legislators’ broad powers allow them to make “value choices,” which 
agencies have to carry out). 
 36. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23–24 (1938) 
(“[F]or the art of regulating an industry requires [expertise]. . . . If the admin-
istrative process is to fill the need for expertness, obviously, as regulation in-
creases, the number of our administrative authorities must increase.”). 
 37. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative 
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975) (arguing that affording participation in 
agency decision-making by all interested parties will create better agency deci-
sions). 
 38. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureau-
cratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (1992) (“[H]aving administrative 
agencies set government policy provides the best hope of implementing civic re-
publicanism’s call for deliberate decision making informed by the values of the 
entire polity.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 
38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31 (1985) (“[I]n its belief in a deliberative conception of 
democracy, [republicanism] provides a basis for evaluating administrative and 
legislative action that has both powerful historical roots and considerable con-
temporary appeal.”). 
 39. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 
2251 (2001) (arguing that presidents should guide agency decision-making be-
cause it would promote accountability for agency decisions and create more ef-
fective agency decisions); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and 
Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 471–72 (1985) (con-
cluding that presidential control over the administrative state is the best way 
to solve the problem of unbounded agency discretion). 
 40. Jürgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, 1 CONSTEL-
LATIONS 1, 5 (1994). The view I advance here generally aligns with Habermas’s 
deliberative-democratic political theory, but departs from his instrumental-ra-
tional understanding of the administrative process. See infra Part III.B. 
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leave space for other voices to influence the choice of policy. 
Though it recognizes the importance of efficient bureaucratic 
performance, the Progressive theory presses a countervailing 
need for public participation and discursive reasoning in admin-
istrative decision-making. By encouraging rational policy devel-
opment between the legislature, executive, and the public at 
large, the Progressive theory aims to enhance the democratic le-
gitimacy of state action. This process of institutional deliberation 
can also reduce the arbitrariness of any given expression of dem-
ocratic will—such as a presidential policy preferences that can-
not claim a wide constituency—by bringing it into dialogue with 
other, conflicting understandings of public needs and values. 
This theory is not “progressive” in the sense that it neces-
sarily entails the adoption of contemporary liberal or left-wing 
political values. While the Progressive state is functionally 
suited to promote various forms of social and economic equality, 
it might also be deployed for certain substantively conservative 
policies, such as the promotion of competitive markets. But Pro-
gressivism insists that any such political agendas be authorized 
through a deliberative-democratic process that draws on the in-
stitutional resources of the administrative apparatus.  
This Progressive understanding motivates a reformulation 
of the major questions doctrine. I suggest that courts should cal-
ibrate their deference to an agency’s resolution of a major ques-
tion to the deliberative quality of the agency’s policymaking pro-
cesses. Courts should assess: (1) the degree to which the agency 
has responded to the affected public in making its policy choice; 
and (2), the degree to which the agency has addressed the rele-
vant questions of political value. Normally, use of the notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedure should suffice to demonstrate 
significant engagement with the affected public. But use of the 
rulemaking procedure should be neither necessary nor sufficient 
for judicial deference. Even if the agency proceeds through infor-
mal rulemaking, courts must ensure that the agency’s explana-
tion of its policy choice actually addresses the political controver-
sies its interpretation implicates. If the interpretation is not 
issued through rulemaking, courts should nonetheless give 
weight to the agency’s view proportional to the deliberative cre-
dentials of the antecedent decision-making procedure. 
This Article proceeds in six parts. In Part I, I trace the de-
velopment of the major questions doctrine as an exception to 
Chevron deference. In Part II, I reconstruct the rationale for the 
doctrine, arguing that it is best understood as reinforcing the 
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nondelegation doctrine and, more fundamentally, deliberative 
democratic control over political choices. In Part III, I argue that 
the major questions doctrine rests on two auxiliary assumptions: 
first, that courts are the best interpreters of the principles and 
policies enacted in legislation; and, second, that agencies should 
serve as value-neutral, technocratic implementers of policies es-
tablished definitively by courts and the legislature. In Part IV, I 
suggest an alternative model of administration, based on Pro-
gressive political thought, which emphasizes the discursive role 
agencies can play in synthesizing expressions of public opinion 
in the form of legislation, presidential input, and public partici-
pation. In Part V, I argue that this Progressive theory better 
comports with our current institutional regime than the court-
centric and technocratic assumptions of the major questions doc-
trine. In Part VI, I deploy this alternative understanding to pro-
pose a revision to the major questions doctrine. I then demon-
strate how this modified approach would apply to the major 
questions cases. 
I.  THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE: A DEPARTURE 
FROM THE TRADITIONAL REGIME OF JUDICIAL 
DEFERENCE   
In this Part, I introduce the major questions doctrine as an 
exception to the general presumption that agency interpreta-
tions of statutory ambiguities are owed at least some level of 
weight or deference. In Section A, I outline the general adminis-
trative-law doctrine of judicial deference to agency statutory in-
terpretation. In Section B, I introduce the major questions cases, 
describing how the doctrine evolved from a qualified presump-
tion against reading marginal statutory provisions to license 
broad delegations into an unqualified presumption against any 
form of delegation concerning politically important matters. 
A. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO 
AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS OF STATUTORY AMBIGUITIES 
The major questions doctrine is a departure from the gen-
eral rule that courts will give some degree of weight or deference 
to agency interpretations of the statutes they are charged with 
administering.41 Courts invoked this principle throughout the 
nineteenth century, before the proliferation of administrative 
 
 41. See supra note 6. 
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tasks had become an issue of major political and legal conten-
tion.42 For instance, in United States v. Moore,43 the Court 
stated: “The construction given to a statute by those charged 
with the duty of executing it is always entitled to the most re-
spectful consideration, and ought not to be overruled without co-
gent reasons.”44 The rule was not absolute, but turned on a set 
of contextual factors, such as the continuity of agency interpre-
tation, and whether the agency interpretation was nearly co-
original with the organic act itself.45 
 
 42. E.g., Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 470 (1900) (“[A Treasury] reg-
ulation . . . should not be disregarded or annulled unless, in the judgment of the 
court, it is plainly and palpably inconsistent with law. Those who insist that 
such a regulation is invalid must make its invalidity so manifest that the court 
has no choice except to hold that the Secretary has exceeded his authority and 
employed means that are not at all appropriate to the end specified in the act of 
Congress.”); U.S. ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40, 48 (1888) (“The court will 
not interfere by mandamus with the executive officers of the government in the 
exercise of their ordinary official duties, even where those duties require an in-
terpretation of the law, the court having no appellate power for that purpose”); 
Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840) (“[J]udgment upon the 
construction of a law must be given in a case in which [heads of departments] 
have jurisdiction, and in which it is their duty to interpret the act of Congress, 
in order to ascertain the rights of the parties in the cause before them. The 
Court could not entertain an appeal from the decision of one of the Secretaries, 
nor revise his judgment in any case where the law authorized him to exercise 
discretion, or judgment. Nor can it by mandamus, act directly upon the officer, 
and guide and control his judgment or discretion in the matters committed to 
his care, in the ordinary discharge of his official duties.”); Edwards’ Lessee v. 
Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827) (“In the construction of a doubtful 
and ambiguous law, the cotemporaneous construction of those who were called 
upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, 
is entitled to very great respect.”). For an illuminating discussion of the evolu-
tion of doctrines of judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation since 
the nineteenth century, see generally Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial 
Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L. J. 908 (2017). Bamzai argues 
that Chevron is a departure from nineteenth-century standards, and from the 
APA, because it conflates and combines the respect due to contemporaneous of-
ficial interpretations, and deference under the extraordinary writs, into a gen-
eral presumption that administrative interpretations of statutory ambiguities 
deserve judicial deference. The merits of that historical argument are beyond 
the scope of this paper. My only point in this Section is that prior to Chevron, in 
a variety of contexts, courts considered the agency’s construction of a statute to 
have considerable authority, and would not invariably interpret the statute de 
novo. 
 43. 95 U.S. 760 (1877) (upholding the Secretary of the Navy’s interpretation 
of statutory provisions fixing annual salaries for assistant-surgeons). 
 44. Id. at 763. 
 45. Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 
(1933) (“[A]dministrative practice, consistent and generally unchallenged, will 
not be overturned except for very cogent reasons if the scope of the command is 
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Judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation took 
on renewed prominence as the New Deal ushered in a rapid ex-
pansion of national administrative capacities.46 The courts be-
gan to distinguish cases where Congress had allocated primary 
interpretive authority to the agency, rather than the judiciary, 
to resolve the meaning of a statutory term with significant policy 
implications. In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,47 the Court 
recognized a zone of interpretive discretion in which the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) definition of “employee” 
was to be accepted by the Court if it had “a warrant in the record 
and a reasonable basis in law.”48 While acknowledging that 
“questions of statutory interpretation . . . are for the courts to 
resolve,”49 the Hearst Court nonetheless recognized that agency 
interpretations might, and sometimes must, inform judicial in-
terpretation. The authority a court would accord to the agency’s 
position would depend on the scope of policymaking authority 
Congress had dedicated to the agency and the degree to which 
the agency demonstrated its expert judgment in its construction 
of the statute.50 
This flexible regime of deference was crucial to many of the 
canonical cases of judicial statutory interpretation during and 
after the New Deal, such as United States v. American Trucking 
Ass’n51 and Griggs v. Duke Power.52 Such cases recognized that 
the delegation of implementing authority to an agency usually 
entailed the delegation of policymaking discretion, since the 
 
indefinite and doubtful. . . . The practice has peculiar weight when it involves a 
contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the respon-
sibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently 
and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.”). 
 46. See Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the 
Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 430–38 
(2007). 
 47. 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
 48. Id. at 131 (internal quotations omitted). 
 49. Id. at 130–31. 
 50. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944); see also Peter L. 
Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and 
“Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012) (distinguishing the 
“weight” courts may give to agency views in determining the boundaries of the 
agency’s interpretative discretion from the “space” in which Congress has allo-
cated primary authority to the agency). 
 51. 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940) (deferring to the opinion of the Wage & Hour 
Division of the Department of Labor). 
 52. 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971) (deferring to interpretation by the EEOC). 
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statute would inevitably leave some of its goals underdeter-
mined. As the Court observed in Morton v. Ruiz, “[t]he power of 
an administrative agency to administer a congressionally cre-
ated and funded program necessarily requires the formulation of 
policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or 
explicitly, by Congress.”53 
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,54 the Court temporarily 
simplified this nuanced regime with its famous two-step proce-
dure. Generalizing the approach first developed in Hearst,55 
Chevron held that if a statutory provision is ambiguous, the 
courts should generally infer that the legislature has delegated 
the interpretive choice to the administering agency by implica-
tion.56 In such cases, courts should defer to the interpretation of 
the administering agency if it is “permissible” or “reasonable.”57 
The scope of Chevron, however, was not entirely clear.58 Did it 
refer to any agency interpretation, no matter the procedural 
form, or did it apply only to legislative rules issued through no-
tice-and-comment procedures? Did courts still have the respon-
sibility to determine independently any possible interpretations 
of ambiguous language as a threshold inquiry?59 Uncertainty 
and disagreement concerning Chevron’s realm of application 
eventually led the Court to specify the forms of agency action to 
which it applied. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca60 and INS v. Aguirre-
Aguirre61 together hold that Chevron applies to interpretations 
reached in the course of binding adjudications, as well as those 
promulgated through rulemaking.62 Christensen v. Harris 
 
 53. 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974). 
 54. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 55. See Peter L. Strauss, In Search of Skidmore, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 789, 
792 (arguing that Chevron “universalized Hearst [by] creat[ing] a presumption 
that to the extent any statute conferring authority for its administration on a 
particular agency lacked a fixed meaning[,] . . . [t]he uncertainties were to be 
regarded as delegations to those agencies of a responsibility reasonably to 
choose among the possibilities the statutory language offered”). 
 56. 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 57. Id. at 843. 
 58. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 833, 835 (2001). 
 59. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 
95 VA. L. REV. 611, 612 (2009). 
 60. 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987). 
 61. 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999). 
 62. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448; Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424. 
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County63 and United States v. Mead Corp.64 indicate that Chev-
ron does not, however, ordinarily extend to documents that are 
not issued in the exercise of the agency’s delegated lawmaking 
authority. Where Chevron does not apply, courts will nonethe-
less usually accord “some deference”65 to the agency’s interpre-
tation, depending on the “thoroughness evident in its considera-
tion, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and 
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power 
to persuade, if lacking power to control.”66 
There are several other wrinkles to the Court’s current 
framework for agency deference, which is better understood as a 
“continuum of deference,” rather than as a set of hard-and-fast 
rules.67 Here, I want to focus on one particularly salient and the-
oretically interesting exception—the major questions excep-
tion—to the general principle that at least some level of defer-
ence is owed to an agency’s interpretations of the statute it 
administers.  
B. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS CASES: FROM KEEPING ELEPHANTS 
OUT OF MOUSEHOLES TO KEEPING ELEPHANTS OUT OF THE 
SAVANNA 
In a series of cases, the Court has declined to defer to agen-
cies’ statutory interpretations where it considers the interpre-
tive question to be one of “economic and political magnitude.”68 
In these cases, the Court presumes that Congress does not im-
pliedly delegate to agencies the authority to resolve particularly 
important matters. This principle has gradually expanded over 
the course of the cases where it has been deployed—from a cau-
tion against reading broad powers into narrow language into a 
general presumption that important questions are simply inap-
propriate for agency resolution. 
 
 63. 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 
 64. 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
 65. Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995). 
 66. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991) (quoting Skid-
more v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).  
 67. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Def-
erence: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from 
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008). 
 68. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000). 
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1. Supreme Court Adoption, Application, and Expansion of the 
Major Questions Doctrine 
The major questions doctrine first emerged as a distinguish-
able technique of statutory interpretation in MCI Telecommuni-
cations Corp. v. AT&T Co.69 In that case, the Court rejected the 
Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) interpretation of 
the filing requirements of the Communications Act of 1934.70 
The FCC had issued a rule that interpreted its authority to mod-
ify71 tariff filing requirements to permit it to waive such require-
ments altogether for certain carriers.72 The late Justice Scalia, 
writing for the Court, first found that the Commissions’s statu-
tory authority to “modify” the requirements did not encompass 
the authority to make a “radical or fundamental change.”73 This 
was presented as an ordinary textual argument, relying on dic-
tionary definitions of “modify,” rather than the importance of the 
interpretive question.74 He then concluded that the broad filing 
waiver was indeed a radical change, and thus exceeded the 
bounds of the FCC’s interpretive discretion. In the Court’s view, 
the waiver was “a fundamental revision of the statute,” rather 
than an incremental adjustment, since it withdrew the Act’s cru-
cial filing requirements from “40% of a major sector of the indus-
try.”75 If these premises are valid, this argument resolves the 
question decisively against the agency. If “modify” connotes a 
limited administrative authority, then an agency cannot make a 
major change in reliance upon that statutory term. As Justice 
Scalia memorably stated in a later case, “Congress . . . does not 
. . . hide elephants in mouseholes.”76 
But Justice Scalia at one point announces a broader princi-
ple, not necessary to the holding: “It is highly unlikely that Con-
gress would leave the determination of whether an industry will 
be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency dis-
cretion—and even more unlikely that it would achieve that 
 
 69. 512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
 70. Id. at 234. 
 71. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (2012). 
 72. In re Tariff Filing Requirements for Interstate Common Carriers, 7 
FCC Rcd. 8072, 8075 (Nov. 25, 1992). 
 73. MCI, 512 U.S. at 229. 
 74. Id. at 225–29. 
 75. Id. at 231. 
 76. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (citing 
MCI, 512 U.S. at 231; FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Corp., 529 U.S. 
120, 159–60 (2000)). 
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through such a subtle device as permission to ‘modify’ rate-filing 
requirements.”77 This dictum inaugurates the major questions 
doctrine. Here, Scalia did not merely suggest that the FCC’s ma-
jor change in filing requirements was an impermissible expan-
sion of the plain meaning of modify. Rather, he presumed that 
Congress would not in any event authorize an administrative 
agency to make decisions of major economic import without an 
express delegation of such authority. 
This presumption became central to the holding in FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson.78 In that case, the Court declined to grant 
Chevron deference to a Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
rule interpreting the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 to 
permit it to regulate nicotine, cigarettes, and smokeless to-
bacco.79 Specifically, the FDA maintained that nicotine could be 
regulated as a “drug,” defined as an “article[] (other than food) 
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body,”80 
and that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco could each be regu-
lated as a “device,” meaning, in relevant part, “an instrument, 
apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance . . . intended to af-
fect the structure or any function of the body.”81 The Court re-
jected the FDA’s interpretation.82 Though the it might ordinarily 
defer to the FDA’s reasonable interpretation of the statutory def-
inition of drug and device,83 the Court reasoned: 
This is hardly an ordinary case. Contrary to its representations to Con-
gress since 1914, the FDA has now asserted jurisdiction to regulate an 
industry constituting of a significant portion of the American econ-
omy. . . . [W]e are confident that Congress could not have intended to 
delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to an 
agency in so cryptic a fashion.84 
 
 77. MCI, 512 U.S. at 231. 
 78. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160–61. 
 79. Id. at 160. 
 80. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (2012); 
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 127. 
 81. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h); Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 127. 
 82. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161. 
 83. See Jody Freedman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From 
Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 73; see also Theodore W. Ruger, The 
Story of FDA v. Brown & Williamson: The Norm of Agency Continuity, in STAT-
UTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 335, 358–59 (William N. Eskridge Jr. et al. 
eds., 2011). 
 84. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159–60. 
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Relying on MCI, the Court established a presumption against 
Chevron-style implied delegation where a major question was 
concerned.85  
 In fact, however, the Court had significantly expanded the 
holding of MCI. In the latter case, the Court had found that the 
plain meaning of the term “modify” indicated that the FCC could 
not make a major amendment to the regulatory scheme under 
that provision. In Brown & Williamson, by contrast, the terms 
“drug” and “device” plainly comprehend nicotine and cigarettes, 
respectively, as a matter of English usage. The doctrine there-
fore morphs in Brown & Williamson into a general presumption 
against implied delegation, where the Court independently de-
termines that the issue is simply too significant to be left to the 
agency. Above and beyond the traditional tools of statutory con-
struction, the major questions doctrine therefore provides addi-
tional grounds for delimiting the scope of agency authority.86 
Where the Court concludes that the agency has made an im-
portant policy decision with far-reaching consequences under 
ambiguous legislative authority, the Court will not defer, but ra-
ther, take on the interpretive task itself. 
Two subsequent cases confirmed that the major questions 
doctrine was not a fleeting aberration, but a persistent—if spar-
ingly invoked—element of the Court’s deference regime. In Util-
ity Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,87 the Court again invoked the 
 
 85. Id. at 160. 
 86. In Brown & Williamson, Justice O’Connor offers three separate argu-
ments to conclude that Congress had spoken to the precise question at issue, 
and thus Chevron deference was unwarranted: (1) she first combines a “whole 
act” argument—the FDA would have to ban cigarettes from the market if it 
regulated them as a device—with a “whole code” argument—other statutes 
evince Congress’s intent to regulate cigarettes rather than to ban them—to ar-
gue that Congress could not have intended for the FDA to regulate cigarettes, 
id. at 133–43; (2) she then argues that Congress had “acted against the back-
drop of” and thus “ratified” the Agency’s previous position that it did not have 
authority to regulate nicotine or cigarettes when it enacted other statutes reg-
ulating tobacco, id. at 144; and (3) she finally argues, separately, that the eco-
nomic and political significance of regulating cigarettes indicates that Congress 
did not delegate this regulatory choice to the agency, id. at 159–61. The major 
questions argument is thus one of three independent strands that together sup-
port the Court’s conclusion that Congress did not impliedly delegate interpreta-
tive discretion to the agency with regards to cigarettes. Though the major ques-
tions issue is just one prong of the Chevron step one analysis here, it is 
analytically distinct, and was thus positioned to stand on its own as grounds to 
withhold deference from an implementing agency. 
 87. 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
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major questions doctrine to support its conclusion that the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) greenhouse-gas emissions 
standards and permitting requirements for motor vehicles im-
permissibly interpreted the Clean Air Act.88 Citing MCI and 
Brown & Williamson, Justice Scalia reasoned that the “EPA’s 
interpretation is . . . unreasonable because it would bring about 
an enormous and transformative expansion in [the] EPA’s regu-
latory authority without clear congressional authorization. . . . 
We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an 
agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’”89 
In Gonzales v. Oregon,90 decided eight years earlier, the 
Court had applied the major questions doctrine somewhat differ-
ently. In that case, the doctrine helped to determine the amount 
of weight owed to the Attorney General’s interpretive rule that 
constructed the registration provisions of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act to prohibit the prescription of certain drugs used in 
physician-assisted suicide.91 Citing Brown & Williamson, the 
Court reasoned that the interpretive rule did not fall under the 
Chevron framework, because Congress would not have delegated 
authority over an issue of such political significance through the 
statute’s registration provisions.92 It explained: “The importance 
of the issue of physician-assisted suicide, which has been the 
subject of an ‘earnest and profound debate’ across the country 
. . . makes the oblique form of the claimed delegation all the more 
suspect.”93 Instead, the Court treated the interpretive rule as a 
nonbinding document, which would be accorded weight only to 
the extent that it had “power to persuade.”94 Because the Attor-
ney General lacked any medical expertise relevant to the regu-
lation of physician-assisted suicide, and because of the “apparent 
absence of any consultation with anyone . . . who might aid in a 
reasoned judgment,” the Court considered the rule’s persuasive 
force to be nil.95 
 
 88. Id. at 2444–45. 
 89. Id. at 2444. 
 90. 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 91. Id. at 250–54. 
 92. Id. at 267. 
 93. Id. at 267–68 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 
(2006)). 
 94. Id. at 268. 
 95. Id. at 269. 
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The major questions doctrine was applied and expanded by 
the Supreme Court in King v. Burwell.96 There, the Court denied 
deference to the IRS interpretation of a key provision of the Af-
fordable Care Act.97 The IRS had interpreted “Exchange estab-
lished by the State”98 to include exchanges established by the 
federal government, so that healthcare tax credits could be pro-
vided through such latter exchanges.99 The Court, citing lan-
guage from Brown & Williamson, declined to defer to the 
agency’s interpretation of the admittedly ambiguous provision: 
The tax credits are among the Act’s key reforms, involving billions of 
dollars in spending each year and affecting the price of health insur-
ance for millions of people. Whether those credits are available on Fed-
eral Exchanges is thus a question of deep “economic and political sig-
nificance” that is central to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished 
to assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so ex-
pressly.100 
The Court then went on to offer its own construction of the Act 
without any regard to the IRS’s interpretation. Analyzing the 
overall statutory structure and Congress’s “legislative plan,” it 
concluded independently that the provision did, in fact, mean 
what the IRS had thought it meant.101  
Note that in King, there is a subtle yet significant expansion 
in the application of the major questions doctrine from Brown & 
Williamson: the IRS’s interpretation was not a departure from 
its previous position, as had been the case in the FDA’s decision 
to regulate tobacco products. In characterizing the FDA’s deci-
sion to regulate tobacco products as an “extraordinary case[]” 
that did not merit Chevron deference, Justice O’Connor empha-
sized that the FDA’s current claims were “[c]ontrary to its rep-
resentations to Congress since 1914.”102 The fact that the agency 
had reversed a longstanding position made the Agency’s asser-
tion of “jurisdiction to regulate . . . a significant portion of the 
American economy” particularly suspect.103 In King, by contrast, 
the major questions doctrine was invoked to decline deference to 
 
 96. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 97. Id. at 2488–89. 
 98. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)–(c) (2012). 
 99. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,378 
(May 23, 2012) (codified as amended at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 602). 
 100. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89 (citing Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 
134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)). 
 101. Id. at 2496. 
 102. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000). 
 103. Id. at 123. 
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the “contemporaneous construction” of a recently enacted stat-
ute by an agency charged with administering it—a case where 
great deference would ordinarily be particularly appropriate.104 
The Court nonetheless asserted its interpretive prerogative, 
wresting power away from the agency, only to conclude that the 
agency had been right all along. The disagreement was struc-
tural—who decides?—rather than substantive—what is the an-
swer? 
2. Circuit Court Interpretation and Expansion of the Major 
Questions Doctrine 
Another high-profile use of the major questions doctrine 
came in Texas v. United States, where the Fifth Circuit upheld 
the district court’s nationwide injunction on DAPA.105 The DAPA 
program set out general criteria for Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) immigration-enforcement officials to consider in 
deferring removal proceedings for undocumented immigrants 
and in conferring a status of “lawful[] presen[ce]” that would en-
able recipients to apply for employment eligibility and social se-
curity benefits.106 In concluding that Texas was likely to succeed 
on the merits of its challenge to DAPA under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), the court concluded that, aside from its 
procedural deficiencies, the policy was substantively beyond the 
delegated immigration enforcement authority of the Depart-
ment.107 The court relied on the major questions doctrine to re-
ject DHS’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA), reasoning that: 
DAPA would make 4.3 million otherwise removable aliens eligible for 
lawful presence, employment authorization, and associated benefits 
. . . . DAPA undoubtedly implicates “question[s] of ‘deep economic and 
political significance’ that [are] central to this statutory scheme; had 
Congress wished to assign that decision to an agency, it surely would 
have done so expressly.”108 
 
 104. See Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 
(1933); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 252 (2001) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting); FDIC v. Phila. Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 438–39 (1986). 
 105. 809 F.3d. 134 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 106. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., for León Rodríguez, Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Serv., et al. (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 
14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf. 
 107. Texas, 809 F.3d. at 186. 
 108. Id. at 181. 
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Despite admittedly “broad grants of authority”109 to the Secre-
tary of DHS to “establish[] national immigration enforcement 
policies and priorities,”110 the court concluded that the INA could 
not be construed to grant such policymaking discretion to 
DHS.111 
In this judgment, the major questions doctrine takes on its 
full potential breadth. Despite explicit statutory terms granting 
enforcement policy discretion, the court concluded that Congress 
simply could not have meant to vest the Secretary of DHS with 
authority to make such a major change in immigration policy. 
One might therefore say that, in its most extreme form, the ma-
jor questions doctrine not only aims to keep administrative ele-
phants from emerging out of statutory mouseholes, but also aims 
to take elephants out of the savanna of administrative policy-
making altogether. Even when Congress explicitly grants broad 
policymaking discretion to agencies, the major questions doc-
trine may deny deference to interpretations that seem, by the 
court’s judgment, to be politically portentous. This incarnation 
of the major questions doctrine remains in force, though without 
the benefit of a Supreme Court opinion grappling with its rea-
soning. The Court granted certiorari in Texas v. United States, 
but ultimately affirmed the judgment by an equally divided 
Court.112  
Another in-depth discussion of the major questions doctrine 
came in U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, in which the D.C. Circuit 
denied rehearing en banc of an unsuccessful challenge to the 
FCC’s Open Internet Order.113 The Order imposed common-car-
rier regulations on Internet service providers in the interest of 
 
 109. Id. at 183. 
 110. 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (2012). 
 111. The Fifth Circuit went on to use the major questions doctrine to find 
the DHS interpretation unreasonable under Chevron step two. Assuming ar-
guendo that the Department’s interpretation of the INA was not barred at Chev-
ron step one, the court found that the interpretation was impermissible at Chev-
ron step two, because it was “an unreasonable interpretation that is ‘manifestly 
contrary’” to the Act. Texas, 809 F.3d. at 182. It found that the grant of enforce-
ment policy discretion to the Secretary could not “reasonably be construed as 
assigning ‘decisions of vast economic and political significance,’ such as DAPA, 
to an agency.” Id. at 183. 
 112. See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 113. 855 F.3d. 674, 382 (2017). 
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ensuring open and nondiscriminatory public access to the Inter-
net.114 The FCC relied on its statutory authority to regulate tel-
ecommunications services as common carriers.115 In his dissent 
from the denial, Judge Kavanaugh argued that: “The FCC’s net 
neutrality rule is a major rule, but Congress has not clearly au-
thorized the FCC to issue the rule. For that reason alone, the 
rule is unlawful.”116 The concurrence in the denial from Judges 
Srinivasan and Tatel emphasized that the Supreme Court had 
already recognized that the meaning of telecommunications ser-
vice was ambiguous, and that it was therefore left to the FCC’s 
discretion whether to classify Internet service providers as 
such.117 But, in Judge Kavanaugh’s view, the net-neutrality rule, 
as a major rule, required an express congressional delegation of 
authority, and could not be supported by ambiguity in the stat-
utory text.118 As he admits, the conclusion that a rule is major 
“has a bit of a ‘know it when you see it’ quality.”119 Such an open-
ended judgment call could doom agency action in the absence of 
a crystal-clear statutory mandate. 
II.  RECONSTRUCTING THE RATIONALE FOR THE 
MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE: FROM 
NONDELEGATION TO POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY   
Why should courts presume that Congress does not delegate 
interpretative authority to agencies on major issues? Bracketing 
the question of how precisely we are to distinguish questions 
that are major from those that are minor or interstitial, why 
should we suppose that Congress would not assign such issues 
of economic and political magnitude to the judgment of adminis-
tering agencies? Scholars have offered, and in some cases en-
dorsed, several different rationales for the doctrine, including 
 
 114. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,738 (Apr. 
13, 2015) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 8 & 20). 
 115. 47 U.S.C. § 153(53) (2012). 
 116. U.S. Telecom, 855 F.3d. at 418 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 117. Id. at 383 (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Serv. v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005)). 
 118. Id. at 423 (Kavanaugh J., dissenting). 
 119. Id. 
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combatting agency aggrandizement;120 supporting the under-en-
forced constitutional principle of nondelegation;121 enforcing leg-
islative supremacy;122 and avoiding administrative interference 
with public deliberation.123 In this Part, I will argue that the ma-
jor questions doctrine is an interpretive presumption that but-
tresses the under-enforced constitutional norm of popular sover-
eignty. The principles of nondelegation, legislative supremacy, 
and deliberation-inducement that have been put forward in de-
fense of the doctrine each protect democratic legitimacy at dif-
ferent levels of institutionalization—the people’s allocation of 
constitutional power; the special status of Congress as a demo-
cratically accountable institution; and the protection of the on-
going process of political discourse that tethers governmental ac-
tion to public opinion. This democracy-reinforcing vision 
supposes that major value choices must be made in a transpar-
ent, accountable, inclusive, and deliberative fashion.  
In Section A, I show that the major questions doctrine is a 
statutory presumption that reinforces the constitutional norm of 
nondelegation. In Section B, I relate the nondelegation doctrine 
to a deeper democratic norm: that fundamental questions of 
principle and policy must be settled in a deliberative process that 
includes members of the affected public. 
 
 120. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 
13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’ Y 203, 261 (2004); Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, 
Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 1015–16 
(1999); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 58, at 844–45. 
 121. See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoid-
ance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 224–27; Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding 
Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19, 26–33 (2010). 
 122. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Compar-
ative Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies 
to Interpret Statutes, 2013 WISC. L. REV. 411, 436 (“When an agency such as the 
FDA makes a major policy move on its own, without sufficient mooring in a 
congressional authorization, it undercuts the democratic legitimacy of stat-
utes.”); Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception to 
Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (Or Why Massachusetts v. 
EPA Got It Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593, 631 (2008). 
 123. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF 
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 287–89 (2010); see also Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 764 
(2007) (“[T]he Court withheld deference because the respective administra-
tions—agency heads, key White House officials, or even the President himself—
although electorally accountable, had interpreted broad delegations in ways 
that were undemocratic when viewed in the larger legal and social contexts.”). 
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A. THE DOCTRINAL STATUS OF THE MAJOR QUESTIONS RULE: 
REINFORCING NONDELEGATION THROUGH STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court turned to 
substantive canons of statutory interpretation as a means of en-
forcing its conception of constitutional values.124 Substantive 
canons, such as the requirement that Congress must make its 
intention absolutely clear if it wishes to alter the balance of state 
and federal powers,125 allow the courts to police constitutional 
structural norms without taking the aggressive step of striking 
down unconstitutional legislation.126 Such substantive canons 
encompassed administrative interpretations of statutes, such as 
when the Court rejected the NLRB’s decision to exercise juris-
diction over certain religious schools in order to avoid conflict 
between the National Labor Relations Act and the First Amend-
ment.127 
Amongst the constitutional values the Court sought to pro-
tect with its substantive canons was the nondelegation doctrine. 
In Mistretta v. United States, where the Court upheld Congress’s 
delegation of authority to promulgate sentencing guidelines to a 
judicial commission, the Court noted that “[i]n recent years, our 
application of the nondelegation doctrine principally has been 
limited to the interpretation of statutory texts, and, more partic-
ularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations 
that might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional.”128 The 
Court cited Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American 
Petroleum Institute (The Benzene Case), where it had rejected the 
Occupational Health and Safety Administration’s (OSHA) ben-
zene exposure standards, in part, for failure to quantify ade-
quately the carcinogenic risk posed by benzene.129 In that case, 
 
 124. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
275–308 (1994). 
 125. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991); Will v. Mich. 
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984). 
 126. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLA-
TION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 712–
48 (5th ed. 2014) (discussing and critiquing constitutional avoidance canons and 
clear statement rules). 
 127. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 506 (1979). 
 128. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989). 
 129. Id. 
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Justice Stevens reasoned in his plurality opinion, “[i]n the ab-
sence of a clear mandate in the Act, it is unreasonable to assume 
that Congress intended to give the Secretary the unprecedented 
power over American industry that would result from the Gov-
ernment’s view.”130 Stevens went on to reason that if OSHA were 
correct that the Act did not compel a quantification of the risk 
posed by benzene, 
the statute would make such a ‘sweeping delegation of legislative 
power ’ that it might be unconstitutional under the Court’s reasoning 
in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, and Panama Refin-
ing Co. v. Ryan. A construction of the statute that avoids this kind of 
open-ended grant should certainly be favored.131 
The Benzene Case provides the clearest precedent for the 
major questions doctrine,132 and links it definitively to the non-
delegation doctrine. In Utility Air Regulatory Group,133 Justice 
Scalia cites the plurality opinion in The Benzene Case for the 
proposition that “[w]e expect Congress to speak clearly if it 
wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and po-
litical significance.’”134 This language suggests that the major 
questions doctrine is a clear statement rule which reinforces the 
nondelegation doctrine.135 
By presuming that Congress does not intend administrative 
agencies to settle major questions, the Court construes statutes 
so as to avoid the impermissible delegation of legislative power 
that might occur if the agency could resolve important questions 
of principle and policy. Since the primary purpose of the major 
questions doctrine is to reinforce the nondelegation doctrine in 
 
 130. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645 
(1980). 
 131. Id. at 656 (internal citations omitted). 
 132. I do not include The Benzene Case amongst the major questions cases 
described in Part I.A.1, supra, because it predates Chevron, and therefore does 
not analyze issues of statutory ambiguity in the way that all the other major 
questions cases do—using the doctrine to undercut the Chevron presumption 
that any statutory ambiguity should be construed as granting a degree of defer-
ence or weight to the administering agency’s interpretation. On the disjunction 
between the approach in The Benzene Case and Chevron, see Richard J. Pierce, 
Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of 
Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 311 (1988) (“If the Supreme Court 
had adopted the Chevron test before it decided Benzene . . . the Court probably 
would have resolved [the] case with a single unanimous opinion.”). 
 133. 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
 134. Id. at 2444. 
 135. Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 
1946 (2017). 
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this way, the justification for the major questions doctrine must 
be sought out in the nondelegation doctrine itself. 
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE 
NONDELEGATION AND MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINES: 
DEMOCRACY-REINFORCEMENT 
The nondelegation doctrine rests on democratic-constitu-
tional foundations. At the deepest level, the nondelegation doc-
trine respects the people’s allocation of constitutional power 
amongst the branches of government. The Constitution provides, 
“All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Con-
gress of the United States.”136 The nondelegation doctrine aims 
to preserve these constitutionally vested jurisdictional rights of 
Congress. The “constitutional rights”137 of Congress are ulti-
mately rooted in “the public rights”138 of the people, who are “the 
only legitimate fountain of power.”139 The authority of the people 
to distribute power is preserved by holding Congress to certain 
standards of clarity with regards to its legislative product. Con-
gress must “lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle,” 
by which the courts, Congress, and the people can determine the 
legality of administrative action.140 
But the nondelegation doctrine does not merely aim to sup-
port the people’s fundamental constitutional decision to vest leg-
islative power in one particular body rather than another. Ra-
ther, legislation itself is thought to have special democratic 
credentials. As Justice Rehnquist noted in his concurrence in 
The Benzene Case, “[The nondelegation doctrine] ensures to the 
extent consistent with orderly governmental administration 
that important choices of social policy are made by Congress, the 
branch of our Government most responsive to the popular 
will.”141 Congress’s “electoral connection” to the public,142 and its 
 
 136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 137. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
 138. Id. 
 139. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 339 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
 140. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
 141. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 142. See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNEC-
TION (1974) (discussing how congressmen connect to the public and seek to get 
reelected). 
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special investigative and deliberative competencies,143 are 
thought to make it the preeminent voice of the people as a whole. 
This link between congressional legislation and democratic legit-
imacy has been widely asserted across ideological and theoreti-
cal lines in American jurisprudence.144 
Such a legislative conception of democracy leads to the con-
clusion that democracy can be preserved only if Congress makes 
basic value choices in the people’s name.145 As James Willard 
Hurst argues, “A statute embodies a choice of values carrying 
obligations on those within its governance, backed by the force 
of the state.”146 By making the basic value choices that will guide 
policy, Congress retains normative authority over regulatory ac-
tivity. 
The major questions doctrine aims to protect this legislative 
jurisdiction over the choice of political values. It does so by as-
suming Congress does not leave important value choices to agen-
cies. Justice Breyer has articulated this position most clearly. 
Justice Breyer arguably invented the major questions doctrine 
in 1986, when he claimed that “Congress is more likely to have 
 
 143. See generally KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE OR-
GANIZATION (1991) (arguing that the committee system enables Congress to de-
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 144. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
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body the people’s will . . . . [A]n interpretation of a statute that tends to imple-
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consistent with the Constitution’s democratic purpose.”); FELIX FRANKFURTER, 
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE READING OF STATUTES 16 (1947) (stating that Con-
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BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 397 
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Forward: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014) 
(stating that Congress is the people’s “most immediate agent”). 
 145. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
473 U.S. 614, 651 (1985) (referring to “the extraordinary ‘magnitude’ of the 
value choices made by Congress in enacting the Sherman Act”) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963) (“A value 
choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits of judicial competence, 
and in any event has been made for us already, by Congress . . . .”). 
 146. JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 40 (1982). 
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focused upon, and answered, major questions, while leaving in-
terstitial matters to answer themselves in the course of the stat-
ute’s daily administration.”147 Breyer has most recently justified 
the doctrine on explicitly democratic grounds. He argues that the 
way to avoid “conflict between democracy and administration” is 
to ensure that administration simply “complements” democracy 
“by implementing legislatively determined general policy objec-
tives.”148 In order to determine the scope of the authority left to 
administrative discretion, Breyer would have us consult the 
standpoint of the “reasonable member of Congress.”149 Breyer 
asserts that such a reasonable legislator would not have wanted 
courts to defer to agencies on questions of “national importance” 
or “major importance.”150 This is a generic presumption that is 
not based in particular legislative text, purpose, or history. Its 
connection to any specific legislative intent is therefore tenu-
ous.151 It is rather a presumption that aims to reinforce demo-
cratic decision-making by increasing the costs to Congress of im-
pliedly delegating significant policy questions to agencies—it 
must do so expressly, if at all. 
The doctrine also purports to safeguard the broader process 
of informed and inclusive political discourse that underlies and 
legitimates lawmaking. Abigail Moncrieff argues that MCI and 
Brown & Williamson are best explained by the fact that the 
agency action in each case interrupted ongoing congressional de-
liberations over the topic at issue.152 Lisa Bressman likewise ar-
gues that in Brown & Williamson and Gonzales, the administra-
tive agencies in question had undermined democratic 
 
 147. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986). This passage was quoted in full by Justice O’Con-
nor in her opinion for the Court in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).  
 148. Breyer, supra note 144, at 103. 
 149. Id. at 106–08. 
 150. Id. at 107. 
 151. Gluck & Schultz Bressman, supra note 5, find that over sixty percent of 
surveyed congressional staffers who draft legislation do not intend the agency 
to resolve major questions. Id. at 1003. But over thirty percent of respondents 
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had an “obligation” to address major questions, it sometimes fails to do so be-
cause legislators cannot reach an agreement on such issues. Id. at 1004. More-
over, these data do not tell us what elected representatives themselves intend, 
much less what Congress as a whole intends, if anything, with regards to a par-
ticular piece of legislation. 
 152. Moncrieff, supra note 122, at 621–32. 
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accountability by acting contrary to legislative preferences and 
short-circuiting public debate: “The Court’s decisions demon-
strate that no administration is entitled to disregard Congress’s 
likely preferences or fence out popular consideration of contested 
issues, no matter the reason.”153 In a similar vein, William 
Eskridge argues that legislation has special democratic legiti-
macy because “[t]he imprimatur of three differently constituted 
electorates guarantees a variety of democratic inputs into na-
tional policy decisions.”154 According to Eskridge, it is not merely 
the democratic credentials of Congress itself, but also the wider 
deliberations that go on between the public and the political 
branches of government in the run-up to enactment, that give 
statutes their special claim to bind.155  
The argument thus far has reconstructed the rationale be-
hind the major questions doctrine as one of democracy-reinforce-
ment. Interpreted in its best light, the doctrine aims to protect 
and to strengthen the connection between the people and gov-
ernmental action by presuming that a popular and deliberative 
process settles major questions of policy. This democratic princi-
ple has constitutional, institutional, and discursive dimensions: 
the people’s constitutional choice to vest legislative power pri-
marily in Congress must be preserved; Congress’s special insti-
tutional competencies to represent electoral constituencies and 
investigate social problems must be respected; and the People’s 
ongoing engagement with the government in the form of public 
debate and interbranch dialogue must be fostered. To this ex-
tent, the major questions doctrine rests on sound principles of 
democratic constitutionalism. Note, however, that the principle 
of democracy-reinforcement does not explain one crucial premise 
of the major questions doctrine: that if legislation has left an am-
biguity with respect to a major question, democratic accounta-
bility will be better served if a court, rather than the administer-
ing agency, resolves that ambiguity. In the next Part, I will 
explore and critique the reasons for this assumption. 
 
 153. Schultz Bressman, supra note 123, at 780 (footnote omitted). 
 154. Eskridge, supra note 122, at 436. 
 155. See id., at 423. 
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III.  WEBERIAN AND COURT-CENTRIC ASSUMPTIONS 
UNDERLYING THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE   
The major questions doctrine supposes that courts are the 
primary interpreters of statutory values and that administrative 
agencies should be limited to technocratic tasks.156 These as-
sumptions may have a sort of common-sense appeal for legal 
practitioners and scholars. But they are far from self-evident. 
Instead, as I will show in this Part, they are rooted in a particu-
lar and contestable ideology of the administrative state. Here I 
aim to unpack and critique these institutional ideologies that 
support the major questions doctrine. In Section A, I will de-
scribe the court-centric assumptions that support the major 
questions doctrine. In Section B, I will describe its reliance on 
Weberian conceptions of administration. In both Sections, I will 
suggest that these assumptions are controversial and run the 
risk of undermining rather than outlining the conditions of ad-
ministrative legitimacy. 
A. THE LEGAL PROCESS SCHOOL AND JUDICIAL SUPREMACY IN 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
In the major questions cases, the court resolves statutory 
ambiguities instead of deferring to the agency’s interpretation. 
The doctrine therefore rests on the assumption that courts have 
superior institutional competence relative to agencies in identi-
fying the important value choices Congress has made. This as-
sumption has its roots in some of the classic thinkers of the Legal 
Process School. Lon Fuller, for example, believed that “there is 
reason to prefer that form of government which controls moral 
attitudes less abstract than mere respect for the will of the state, 
and that means, I believe, preeminently government by 
judges.”157 Ronald Dworkin likewise maintained that judges 
have the primary responsibility to interpret the basic purposes 
expressed in statute, and to identify the principles and policies 
those laws embody.158 He paid scarcely any attention to the role 
of agencies in fleshing out statutory meaning, not even consider-
ing the possibility that they could resolve questions of principle 
 
 156. See supra notes 147–51 and accompanying text. 
 157. LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 135 (1940). 
 158. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 313–54 (1986) (arguing that 
judges should interpret statutes in a way that promotes the integrity of law, 
fairness, democratic values, and their own views of justice and policy). 
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in the exercise of their discretion. John Hart Ely similarly ar-
gued for a revival of the nondelegation doctrine on the grounds 
that democratic accountability could only be preserved if Con-
gress retained its responsibility for making the basic normative 
decisions in the form of statutory law.159  
The major questions cases are therefore best understood as 
a way to reassert the primacy of courts over agencies as the in-
terpretive agents of Congress. As Professor Abbe Gluck has ob-
served, King is only the latest case in which the Court has re-
turned to the confident purposive spirit of the Legal Process 
School, and sought to reinvigorate an interpretive partnership 
between Congress and the courts in regulatory law: “This Court 
seems to want the big questions for itself.”160 
On first blush, this court-centric vision of statutory interpre-
tation seems nonproblematic. Marbury v. Madison, after all, es-
tablished that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.”161 But recall that 
Marbury also drew a distinction between administrative actions 
that were “only politically examinable,” and those that were sub-
ject to a nondiscretionary statutory duty, and could thus be com-
pelled by a writ of mandamus.162 Administrative law articulates 
this distinction between legal obligation and political discretion 
in its details. It aims to determine precisely how statutes allocate 
interpretive authority between agencies and courts, acknowledg-
ing that some questions of statutory interpretation involve polit-
ical or empirical questions, which executive agencies, rather 
than courts, ought to decide in the first instance.163 Chevron’s 
deference regime rests on the premise that “federal judges—who 
have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy 
choices made by those who do.”164 It reinforces the separation of 
 
 159. ELY, supra note 4, at 132–33. 
 160. Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding 
Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 65 
(2015). 
 161. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 162. Id. at 166. 
 163. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1983) (“[J]udicial review of administrative action con-
tains a question of the allocation of law-making competence in every case . . . . 
The court’s interpretational task is . . . to determine the boundaries of delegated 
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 164. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NDRC, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984). 
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powers by instructing judges not to intrude into political contro-
versies that are the proper province of the legislature and exec-
utive, rather than the judiciary.165 
The major questions doctrine is controversial because it 
wrests interpretive authority away from the agency in precisely 
those cases that the court recognizes have “economic and politi-
cal,”166 rather than simply legal, significance. It arises when the 
statutory meaning is acknowledged to be ambiguous, and thus 
any subsequent judicial construction of the statutory require-
ments must rely upon some policy considerations that are not 
purely matters of law. In King, for example, after refusing to de-
fer to the IRS, Chief Justice Roberts was put in the awkward 
position of departing from his textualist colleagues to argue that 
an “Exchange established by a State” must encompass a federal 
exchange, because a contrary reading “could well push a State’s 
individual insurance market into a death spiral.”167 As the late 
Justice Scalia observed, this aspect of the Court’s argument nec-
essarily involved policy judgments about the “extrinsic circum-
stances” in which the law would operate.168 He further noted: 
“This Court holds only the judicial power—the power to pro-
nounce the law as Congress has enacted it. We lack the preroga-
tive to repair laws that do not work out in practice . . . .”169 By 
asserting judicial authority to resolve matters of economic and 
political significance, the major questions doctrine puts courts, 
rather than agencies, in the front-line position of determining 
how to make statutory schemes workable. The judiciary, there-
fore, asserts supremacy over politically-accountable administra-
tive actors in resolving legal questions that must be answered, 
at least in part, by consideration of policy.  
The question this poses is whether the least democratically 
accountable branch of government ought to take on such a polit-
ical role. The answer depends on how we conceptualize the 
proper role of agencies. For if the judiciary does not resolve am-
biguities in the legislature’s policy, the executive surely will.  
 
 165. See Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 273, 289 (2011). 
 166. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014). 
 167. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2493 (2015).  
 168. Id. at 2503 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819)). 
 169. Id. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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B. THE WEBERIAN ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MAJOR QUESTIONS 
DOCTRINE 
Alongside the court-centric assumptions of the Legal Pro-
cess School, the major questions doctrine rests on a normative-
institutional assumption that administrative agencies have a 
purely technical task to perform, and should not answer ques-
tions of significant political value. This view is rooted in Max 
Weber’s seminal theory of bureaucracy and legal authority. Ac-
cording to Weber, the “bureaucratic administrative staff” is the 
“purest type of exercise of legal authority,” because in a system 
of perfect bureaucratic hierarchy and accountability, public offi-
cials neutrally and efficiently apply the abstract norms of a stat-
ute to the facts of particular cases.170 Bureaucracy is a form of 
“domination through knowledge,” which implements the law 
through a system of hierarchical command and technocratic 
competency.171 Weber argues that bureaucracy is “capable of at-
taining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense for-
mally the most rational known means of exercising authority 
over human beings.”172 While regulatory laws might advance 
certain “substantive” values, the state bureaucracy would em-
ploy a purely “instrumental” or “purposive” conception of ration-
ality (zweckrational), attempting to find the best formal means 
to achieve those legislative ends.173  
This descriptive view of bureaucracy led to Weber’s sharp 
normative distinction between the vocation of political officials 
and the vocation of administrative officials. In a world of moral 
and ethical pluralism, the political official had to “take a stand, 
to be passionate,” and to assume “exclusive personal responsibil-
ity for what he does.”174 The civil servant, by contrast, should 
“execute conscientiously the order of the superior authorities, ex-
actly as if the order agreed with his own conviction.”175 He would 
exhibit “a spirit of formalistic impersonality” in implementing 
 
 170. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 220 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wit-
tich eds., 1968). 
 171. Id. at 225. 
 172. Id. at 223. 
 173. Id. at 26, 226. 
 174. MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 95 
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., trans., 1946). 
 175. Id. 
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the law, and thereby attain “the highest degree of efficiency” in 
achieving its ends.176  
This view of administration has had lasting influence in po-
litical and legal theory. Jürgen Habermas, one of the foremost 
proponents of deliberative democratic theory, famously argued 
that “there is no administrative production of meaning.”177 Ad-
ministration, in his view, is a purely technical enterprise, which 
always risks sapping civil society of its reservoirs of cultural 
meaning and ethical commitment.178 Bureaucracy is deeply dan-
gerous to democratic politics, because it proceeds through formal 
rules, hierarchies of command, and specialized knowledge, ra-
ther than through debate between free and equal citizens. Polit-
ical discourse is something that takes place exclusively within 
the public sphere and in the relationship between the public 
sphere and the legislative process. In Between Facts and Norms, 
which synthesized American and German constitutional theory, 
Habermas argued that “[t]he norms fed into the administration 
bind the pursuit of collective goals to pregiven premises and keep 
administrative activity within the horizon of purposive rational-
ity.”179  
American legal scholars and jurists also often rely explicitly 
upon Weberian premises. As Louis Jaffe noted, the seminal ad-
ministrative law scholarship of Ernst Freund and James Landis 
shared Weberian theories of legislatively authorized, expert ad-
ministration.180 Edward Rubin deploys Weber’s theory of bu-
reaucracy to argue that administrative law should focus exclu-
sively on the “instrumental rationality” of administrative action, 
rather than on public participation.181 Jerry Mashaw likewise 
adopts Weber’s view that administration is fundamentally a 
matter of “exercising power on the basis of knowledge.”182 Using 
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1996). 
 180. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. 
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 181. See Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act 
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 159–60 (2003) (considering Weber in 
the principle of instrumental rationality). 
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Weber’s phraseology, Mashaw argues that “[a]gency implement-
ing action is an instrumentally rational exercise,” in the sense 
that agencies must interpret the goals established by the statute 
and then find the best “instruments” to achieve those pur-
poses.183 
This conception of bureaucracy is evident in some Supreme 
Court cases striking down agency action as arbitrary or capri-
cious under the APA.184 For example, in State Farm,185 the Court 
struck down the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion’s rescission of a passive restraint rule for failure to draw a 
“rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made.”186 In Michigan v. EPA,187 the Court rejected the EPA’s 
decision to regulate pollution from power plants because of its 
failure to perform a cost-benefit analysis to assess whether such 
regulation was “appropriate and necessary.”188 In these cases, 
reasoned administrative decision-making is equated with We-
berian instrumental rationality. The agency’s sole task is to find 
the most efficient, cost-effective means to achieve the ends es-
tablished by statute, weighing technological feasibility as well as 
economic effects.189 
As Kevin Stack has demonstrated, this conception of admin-
istrative reason as “means-ends rationality” is echoed in the Le-
gal Process School’s purposivist approach to statutory interpre-
tation.190 The agency’s reasoning process, in this view, must be 
 
 183. Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency-Centered or Court-Centered Administrative 
Law? A Dialogue with Richard Pierce on Agency Statutory Interpretation, 59 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 889, 898 (2007). 
 184. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 185. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
 186. Id. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 
U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
 187. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
 188. Id. at 2706–07 (“Read naturally . . . the phrase ‘appropriate and neces-
sary’ requires at least some attention to cost.”). 
 189. See, e.g., supra notes 183–88 (summarizing analytical steps agencies 
must make when interpreting statutes). 
 190. Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies 
Interpret Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 871, 877–79 (2015) (“[T]he purposive ac-
count suggests that the basic question of judicial review should be whether the 
agency’s action furthers the statute’s purposes within allowable means.”). 
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completely confined to achieving the goals provided for in its or-
ganic act.191 There is thus a deep affinity between the Legal Pro-
cess School’s court-centric emphasis,192 and the Weberian con-
ception of administration. If agencies are restricted to purely 
instrumental reasoning, rather than value-based consideration 
of questions of political significance, they should not be able to 
settle any major policy questions left open by statutory ambigu-
ities.193 This is instead a job for the courts.194 
Weberian conceptions of bureaucracy also provide a power-
ful basis for diagnosing American administrative agencies’ al-
leged failure to deal adequately with ethical values. For exam-
ple, Justice William Brennan relied on Weber’s account of 
bureaucracy to defend the due process revolution in Goldberg v. 
Kelly195 as a necessary judicial response to our “bureaucratic 
state’s” failure to respond to “[the] human realities at stake” in 
administrative action.196 Professor Gerald Frug indicts “the ide-
ology of bureaucracy” in American administrative law, citing 
Weber’s conception of bureaucracy to guide his critique of the 
“deceptive” judicial effort to justify illegitimate assertions of 
state power.197 Most recently, Jacob Gerson and Jeannie Suk198 
have relied on Weber’s description of bureaucracy to criticize the 
Department of Education’s (DOE) interpretation of Title IX,199 
which has imposed extensive reporting requirements and adju-
dicative procedures on universities to address sexual assault and 
harassment.200 Because sex implicates “emotion” and “desire,” 
 
 191. Id. at 879.  
 192. See supra Part III.B. 
 193. See supra Part III.A. 
 194. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 195. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 196. William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and “The Progress of Law,” 
10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 19–20 (1988). 
 197. See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1278, 1297–1305 (1984) (describing the links between 
Weber “formal” view of bureaucracy and the nondelegation doctrine as well). 
 198. See Jacob Gerson & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. 
REV. 881, 884–86 (2016) (“[T]he sex bureaucracy is unfortunately counterpro-
ductive to the goal of actually addressing the harms of rape, sexual assault, and 
sexual harassment.”).  
 199. See Title IX of the Education Amendments (Title IX) of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1681–1688 (2012) (covering the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of 
sex in educational institutions and enforcement provisions). 
 200. See Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School 
Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034, 12040, 12044 
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they suggest that a Weberian, morally blinkered federal bureau-
cracy lacks the institutional competency to address these sensi-
tive and ethically charged issues.201 They imply that “there is a 
democratic deficit underneath the sex bureaucracy,” because 
Congress would not be likely today to pass legislation specifically 
endorsing the DOE interpretation of Title IX.202 
This Weberian view of bureaucracy is an implicit premise of 
the major questions doctrine.203 As Gerson and Suk’s argument 
shows, the Weberian view forecloses agencies from making 
value-laden decisions.204 It is presumptively inappropriate for a 
bureaucracy to make such policy judgments.205 If we follow We-
ber in treating administrative agencies as limited to instrumen-
tal rationality, then we must presume that Congress does not 
permit agencies to make value choices—much less value choices 
concerning matters of “such economic and political signifi-
cance.”206 Instead, they must simply find the appropriate means 
to achieve the value choices Congress has already endorsed, as 
those values have been interpreted by the judiciary.207 
Some of the scholars cited above might be skeptical of the 
nondeferential posture of the major questions doctrine, doubt-
ing, perhaps, whether there is any justiciable way to distinguish 
a major from a minor question of statutory interpretation.208 
 
(Mar. 13, 1997) (“Procedures adopted by schools will vary considerably in detail, 
specificity, and components . . . .”). 
 201. See Gerson & Suk, supra note 198, at 947 (“What does it mean when an 
institution designed to eliminate ‘from official business love, hatred, and all 
purely personal, irrational and emotional elements’ regulates ‘[t]he behavior of 
a human being in sexual matters, [which] is often a prototype for the whole of 
his other modes of reaction to life?’ In part, this is a question about institutional 
match. Is the federal bureaucracy the right political institution to be regulating 
ordinary sex?”) (quoting Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ES-
SAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196, 215–16 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 
1946) and SIGMUND FREUND, SEXUALITY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LOVE 25 
(1963)). 
 202. Id. 
 203. See supra Part III.B. 
 204. See Gerson & Suk, supra note 198, at 886. 
 205. See supra notes 137, 147–48 and accompanying text. 
 206. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000). 
 207. Id. at 161 (stating that administrative action “must always be grounded 
in a valid grant of authority from Congress”). 
 208. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 197, at 1301–04 (drawing on principles based 
on the nondelegation doctrine, “one of the critical ingredients of policymaking 
authority is the ability to decide how much to decide oneself and how much to 
let others decide as problems develop”). 
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But the incorporation of Weberian motifs in administrative law 
scholarship complicates the effort to carve out a space for any 
non-trivial value choices within administrative action. Once one 
adopts Weber’s description of bureaucracy as an efficient instru-
ment of policies and principles established by the legislature,209 
there are indeed strong reasons to presume that Congress would 
not have left such choices to agencies. When our prototype of ad-
ministration is a hierarchical organization composed of techni-
cally sophisticated but perhaps under-socialized experts, it is 
very unappealing to suppose that such characters and institu-
tions might resolve and interpret our political commitments, ra-
ther than merely find the most technologically feasible and cost-
effective means to bring them about. The influence of this strand 
of Weberian political theory has therefore buttressed a strong 
presumption that norm-setting is a matter for legislatures and 
courts, but not for agencies.210  
As the critical assessments of Brennan, Frug, and Gerson 
and Suk suggest, the broader implications of the Weberian con-
ception of administration are normatively troubling. The We-
berian view treats administration as an inherently alienating, 
morally-vacant, and purely technocratic aspect of modern gov-
ernance, which undermines the legitimacy of the regulatory 
state.211 It understands administration as categorically incapa-
ble of fulfilling a basic requirement of democratic constitutional-
ism: that laws and policies must be justified to those they bind 
in ways that are genuinely responsive to their dignity, needs, 
and interests.212 If the Weberian diagnosis of bureaucracy is cor-
rect, and the Weberian prescriptions for administrative reason 
are appropriate, there is little hope that bureaucracy will ever 
be capable of satisfying our desire for a form of government that 
 
 209. WEBER, supra note 170, at 220–26. 
 210. See supra Part III.B. 
 211. See JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 43 (1978) (discussing the tendency 
of Weberian bureaucracy to “fracture the integrity of the individual and destroy 
a society’s sense of community”). 
 212. See generally RAINER FORST, THE RIGHT TO JUSTIFICATION: ELEMENTS 
OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY OF JUSTICE (Jeffrey Flynn trans., Columbia 
Univ. Press 2012) (arguing that democracy requires at a minimum that coercive 
action be justified to the persons it affects in a way they can understand); JERRY 
L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 100–01, 172–253 
(1986) (arguing for an approach to administrative due process that respects hu-
man dignity and liberal-constitutional forms, rather than mere Weberian in-
strumental rationality). 
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is adequately responsive to public feedback, ethical values, or 
private autonomy.213 
There is reason to doubt, however, whether the Weberian 
account is indeed an accurate account of, or desirable standard 
for, the administrative process of the United States. Weber’s vi-
sion of a purely technocratic, formally rational administrative 
state conflicts with an important feature of our institutional re-
gime—the fact that agencies often do engage in forms of deliber-
ative, rather than instrumental, reasoning.214 Whereas instru-
mental rationality attempts to find the best means to achieve a 
given end, deliberative reason engages multiple actors in filling 
out the content of abstract norms to which all parties assent.215 
The discursive aspect of administrative practice has not gone al-
together unnoticed by legal scholars. Mark Seidenfeld’s civic re-
publican theory of the administrative state emphasizes that bu-
reaucratic institutions are capable of high-quality deliberation 
over how best to pursue the common good.216 Henry Richardson 
likewise argues that, even though agencies must pursue the pol-
icies enacted in statutes, this process must be (and sometimes 
is) characterized by deliberative, rather than purely instrumen-
tal reason, as agencies specify statutory norms in value-oriented 
dialogue with the affected public.217 William Eskridge and John 
Ferejohn embrace Richardson’s conception of administrative 
reason, and explicitly recognize that agencies have a central role 
 
 213. See MASHAW, supra note 212, at 252 (In the domain of administrative 
due process, “[t]he personal domination of the coercive caseworker has been re-
placed by general rules susceptible to political control. From a liberal perspec-
tive that is an unambiguous gain. But if what was really wanted was individu-
alized attention based on consensus values and freed from the risks of arbitrary 
personal domination, the transformation to formalism may seem a hollow vic-
tory”). 
 214. See infra Part IV for an extensive defense of this claim. 
 215. On the distinction between instrumental and deliberative reason, see 2 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, A THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 301–31 (Thomas 
McCarthy trans., 1987) (discussing the “distance between expert cultures and 
the broader public” in active civic engagement). 
 216. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic 
State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1547–49 (1992) (“The court should not interfere 
with the agency’s use of its expertise and political awareness to reach a decision 
[it] truly believes is good policy.”). 
 217. HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING 
ABOUT THE ENDS OF POLICY 214–30 (2002) (“Ends that are broadly agreed upon 
in the legislature will get variously interpreted . . . with different substantive 
concerns and different contexts of operation.”). 
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to play in deliberation over the public purposes advanced in stat-
utes.218 They make clear that administrative deliberation is not 
always simply a matter of finding the best means to implement 
a clearly defined norm, but may also involve practical reasoning 
over fundamental public values.219  
The major questions doctrine thus rests on a particular and 
controversial political theory of our administrative state: the leg-
islature bears primary responsibility for making the value 
choices that animate governmental action; and the judiciary 
must ensure that the legislature retains that responsibility by 
presuming that Congress does not delegate that task to agen-
cies.220 Accounts like that of Richardson’s, and Eskridge and 
Ferejohn’s, however, suggest the reemergence of an alternative 
theory: one that I argue better comports with our institutions 
and the ideological origins of our administrative state. The next 
Part explores that theory as the basis for a reformation of the 
major questions doctrine. 
IV.  THE PROGRESSIVE THEORY OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE   
This Part gives an alternative account of our administrative 
process based on the Progressives’ original understanding of the 
state they wanted to create. In Section A, I describe the theoret-
ical origins of Progressive political thought. In Section B, I de-
scribe the Progressive theory. In Section C, I trace the influence 
of the Progressive theory on the welfare and regulatory state 
that emerged during the New Deal. 
A. THE CONTESTED ORIGINS OF PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT: HEGEL AND THE ETHICAL IDEA OF THE STATE 
It is widely recognized that the American Progressives were 
the founding fathers and mothers of our administrative state.221 
 
 218. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 123, at 77–78 (2010). 
 219. Id. at 31–32 (describing “administrative constitutionalism” as “the pri-
mary means by which governmental actors deliberate about how to respond to 
social movement demands or needs,” attending to “higher-level normative con-
siderations,” such as statutory purpose, constitutional rights, and “public 
norms”). 
 220. See supra Part III.B. 
 221. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO FDR 
213–53 (1955) (describing the influence of Progressive thought and politics on 
New Deal reforms); SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE PARTIES: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM SINCE THE NEW DEAL 21–
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But the original Progressive vision has long been distorted by 
legal scholars into a technocratic vision of administrative exper-
tise.222 The time has come to reassess this strand of American 
intellectual history. Progressive political thought has begun to 
receive renewed attention from scholars aiming to reinvigorate 
an administrative state that will reduce social and economic in-
equality by democratic means.223 At the same time, conservative 
critics of the administrative state routinely link our bureaucratic 
government to the philosophy of the American Progressives, and 
their adoption of German conceptions of the state.224 According 
to Philip Hamburger, for example, the Progressives introduced 
dangerous, Germanic conceptions of the state to American law, 
and thus undermined Anglo-American constitutionalism.225 He 
argues that Americans “imbibed” from German civilian legal 
 
51 (1993) (describing the influence of Progressivism on the New Deal); ROBERT 
C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 35 (2014) (discussing Progressive conceptions of the democratic public and 
administration as a basis for contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence); 
STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF 
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877–1920, at 288 (1982) (“The Pro-
gressive state-building sequence has been extended and elaborated over the 
course of this century, but the path of institutional development and the terms 
of the contest for state control have not been fundamentally altered. . . . The 
three great institutional struggles of Franklin Roosevelt’s second term are es-
pecially telling in light of the Progressive experience.”). 
 222. See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, On Predicting the Future of Administrative 
Law, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. J. GOV’T & SOC’Y, May/June 1982, at 18, 19 (“Pro-
gressive doctrine of concentrated power in the hands of technocrats had clearly 
become the dominant political theory by the end of [the 1920s] . . . .”); David B. 
Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 
404–05 (2002) (“Progressive scholars combined a cynical view of politics and 
politicians with a kind of myopic faith in the ability of ‘scientific’ administration 
to cleanse policymaking . . . .”); Mark Tushnet, Administrative Law in the 1930s: 
The Supreme Court’s Accommodation of Progressive Legal Theory, 60 DUKE 
L.J. 1565, 1571 (2011) (describing the Progressive view as holding that “experts 
should lead in making policy through modern administrative agencies.”).  
 223. See, e.g., Rahman, supra note 28, at 1350–51 (drawing on the history of 
the Progressive Era to argue that “[r]egulatory agencies, though often under-
stood in technocratic, expertise-oriented terms, might similarly become spaces 
for democratic action, participation, and accountability”). 
 224. See HAMBURGER, supra note 29, at 453; RONALD J. PESTRITTO, WOOD-
ROW WILSON AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN LIBERALISM 225–30 (2005) (discuss-
ing the Hegelian origins of Woodrow Wilson’s theory of administration); JEAN 
M. YARBROUGH, THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 
19–24, 44–46 (2012) (discussing Roosevelt’s political thought and Hegel’s theory 
of the state). 
 225. See HAMBURGER, supra note 29, at 447–67 (“German ideas thus paved 
the way for the administrative reduction of rights.”).  
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theory “an academic idealization of administrative power and a 
corresponding contempt for many of the formalities of constitu-
tional law.”226 
Such scholarship misunderstands the Progressive concep-
tion of democratic constitutionalism. The Progressives were in-
deed influenced by German conceptions of administrative power; 
but, unlike German state theorists, they sought to make admin-
istration democratically responsive.227 Here, I will briefly sum-
marize the Progressives’ reception of German state theory, and 
their democratization of the original German conception. Pro-
gressivism, of course, was a vast and complicated political move-
ment, which defies a completely comprehensive account.228 My 
reconstruction will single out a set of authors who together pre-
sent a coherent and appealing vision that captures much of what 
is valuable about our current administrative structures. John 
Dewey, Woodrow Wilson, and Frank Goodnow envisioned an ad-
ministrative state in which political values would be fleshed out 
in dialogue between administrators, elected representatives, 
and the public at large.229 Administrative agencies would syn-
thesize three sources of public opinion: legislation, presidential 
policy preference, and direct involvement by affected parties.230 
It is true that American Progressives were influenced by 
German theories of administration. But their inspiration was 
not primarily Weber, but rather G.W.F. Hegel.231 Hegel had 
identified, almost a century before Weber, the importance of ad-
ministrative bodies that were functionally differentiated, hierar-
chically organized, and staffed by expert officials.232 But unlike 
 
 226. Id. at 447. 
 227. See Blake Emerson, The Democratic Reconstruction of the Hegelian 
State in American Progressive Political Thought, 77 REV. POL. 545, 547 (2015) 
(stating that the Progressives “envision[ed] a state thoroughly permeated by 
public deliberation and participation”). 
 228. See Daniel T. Rogers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REV. AM. HIST. 113 
(1982) (discussing complexities and contradictions of Progressive movement). 
 229. See infra Part IV.B.  
 230. See infra Part IV.B.  
 231. See Robert D. Miewald, The Origins of Wilson’s Thought: The German 
Tradition and the Organic State, in POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION: WOODROW 
WILSON AND AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 17, 23–26 (Jack Rabin & 
James S. Brown eds., 1984). 
 232. See M. W. Jackson, Bureaucracy in Hegel’s Political Theory, 18 ADMIN. 
& SOC. 139, 145–46 (1986) (“By implication, Hegel recognized a hierarchy 
within the bureaucracy.”). 
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Weber, who understood the state to be a “monopoly of the legiti-
mate use of physical force,”233 Hegel understood the state as an 
embodiment of “concrete freedom.”234 By this, he meant that the 
state institutionalized the Enlightenment ideals of individual 
and collective self-determination.235 This ethical understanding 
of the state motivated his conception of administration in partic-
ular. Drawing on the experience of liberalizing Prussian social 
reform in the early nineteenth century,236 he argued that an ad-
ministrative state was essential to mitigate poverty, social an-
tagonism, and market failures, in the interests of preserving 
public freedom.237 
But Hegel insisted that administration was not merely a 
matter of efficient bureaucratic performance. Rather, admin-
istration was tasked with “upholding . . . legality and the univer-
sal interest of the state,” while resolving conflicts between social 
groups by reference to “the higher viewpoints and ordinances of 
the state.”238 To accomplish this task, administrative bodies and 
their officials not only needed expertise, but also “direct educa-
tion in ethics and in thought.”239 
Bureaucratic reason was, for Hegel, a reflective, rather than 
purely instrumental, form of reason. That is to say, he supposed 
that when administrators interpreted abstract legal norms, they 
 
 233. WEBER, supra note 174, at 78. 
 234. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 260 (Allen 
Wood ed., H. B. Nisbet, trans. 1991). 
 235. See id. (“The principle of modern states has enormous strength and 
depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to attain fulfilment in the 
self-sufficient extreme of personal particularity . . . .”). 
 236. HEGEL, supra note 234, at x-xi (“In relation to the Prussian state of 
1820 [Hegel] represented the tendency toward moderate, liberalizing reform 
. . . .”). 
 237. Id. at §§ 236–45 (describing the inequalities and antagonisms of mar-
ket-driven “civil society” and the role of law, administration, and regulation in 
redressing them). For the political background on Hegel’s political philosophy, 
see REINHART KOSELLECK, PREUßEN ZWISCHEN REFORM UND REVOLUTION: 
ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT, VERWALTUNG, UND SOZIALE BEWEGUNG VON 1791 
BIS 1848, at 263 (3d ed. 1989) (1967) (Ger.) (author ’s translation) (arguing that 
Hegel “had not only sketched the picture that the Prussian civil servants had of 
themselves, but rather the real situation itself ”); Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff, Hegels 
Staatsrecht als Stellungnahme im Ersten Preussischen Verfassungskampf, 35 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG 476, 476 (1981) (Ger.) (author ’s 
translation) (interpreting the Philosophy of Right in part as “Hegel’s constitu-
tional plan” during the first constitutional struggle in Prussia in the early 
1820s). 
 238. HEGEL, supra note 234, § 289. 
 239. Id. at § 296. 
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would draw on broader public values and social understandings 
to flesh out their concrete content.240 Hegel’s theory, however, 
was not democratic. Though he endorsed representative govern-
ment within the structure of a constitutional monarchy, he be-
lieved public opinion was often misguided and ignorant, and so 
sought to guarantee the public welfare by insulating bureau-
cratic decision-making from its influence.241 It was in this re-
spect that the American Progressives departed from their Ger-
man forbearer. 
B. THE PROGRESSIVES’ DEMOCRATIC THEORY OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
The American Progressives embraced Hegel’s idea of an ad-
ministrative state in which appointed public officials would use 
their expertise and ethical judgment to preserve the public in-
terest and control the excesses of private law, commodity ex-
change, and industrial organization.242 They thus emphasized 
the need for social legislation to authorize the provision of goods 
and services and to protect the public against monopoly.243 The 
overall thrust of this project was succinctly articulated by John 
Dewey and James Tufts:  
[I]t is certain that the country has reached a state of development, in 
which . . . individual achievements and possibilities require new civic 
and political agencies if they are to be maintained as realities. Individ-
ualism means inequity, harshness, and retrogression to barbarism . . . 
unless it is a generalized individualism: an individualism which takes 
into account the real good and effective—not merely formal—freedom 
of every social member.244 
Dewey therefore followed Hegel in arguing for administrative in-
stitutions that would provide the material and social requisites 
for individual freedom on the broadest possible scale. 
 
 240. See Carl K. Shaw, Hegel’s Theory of Modern Bureaucracy, 86 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 381, 385 (1992) (arguing that for Hegel, bureaucratic reasoning is “a 
dialectical process in which the universal and the particular encounter each 
other and become related by means of human deliberation”); see also Robert 
Brandom, Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel’s Idealism: Negotiation and Ad-
ministration in Hegel’s Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual 
Norms, 7 EUR. J. PHIL. 164, 172–78 (1999) (arguing that on Hegel’s theory legal 
norms develop through their “administration” by acknowledged authorities 
within a discursive community of equal persons). 
 241. HEGEL, supra note 234, §§ 318, 279. 
 242. See Emerson, supra note 227; see also HAMBURGER, supra note 29, at 
447–51.  
 243. Rahman, supra note 28.  
 244. JOHN DEWEY & JAMES H. TUFTS, ETHICS 472 (1908). 
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Unlike Hegel, however, the Progressives were profoundly 
committed to democratic principles.245 In his seminal 1887 essay 
The Study of Administration, which inaugurated the American 
field of public administration in 1887, Woodrow Wilson cited He-
gel and the Hegelian public law scholar Lorenz von Stein to ar-
gue that administration “is raised very far above the dull level of 
mere technical detail by the fact that through its greater princi-
ples it is directly connected with the lasting maxims of political 
wisdom, the permanent truths of political progress.”246 Wilson 
emphasized that when administration tackled such “greater 
principles,” it must be guided by public deliberation: 
[A]dministration in the United States must be at all points sensitive to 
public opinion. . . . The ideal for us is a civil service cultured and self-
sufficient enough to act with sense and vigor, and yet so intimately 
connected with popular thought, by means of elections and constant 
public counsel, as to find arbitrariness or class spirit quite out of the 
question.247 
Wilson, like Hegel, thus prized the ideal of a cultured and 
independent civil service that would act in the interest of the 
people as a whole. But he sought to relativize administrative au-
tonomy to various forms of popular political influence. Electoral 
accountability was only one dimension of such influence. A more 
pervasive, “constant public council” would ensure that the pro-
fessional civil service remained in-tune with the concerns of 
those they regulated, rather than being motivated their own self-
interest or other inappropriate criteria. This vision of admin-
istration carried over into President Wilson’s political vision, as 
well as his academic writings. In his presidential campaign, Wil-
son argued: 
[It was the] necessity of the hour to open up all the processes of politics 
and of public business,—open them wide to public view; to make them 
accessible to every force that moves, every opinion that prevails in the 
thought of the people; to give society command of its own economic life 
again, not by revolutionary measures, but by a steady application of 
 
 245. See LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITU-
TIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 215 (2005) (“Progressives . . . mounted a sus-
tained effort to reconstruct the nation’s constitutions, root and branch—not 
merely to legitimate the new administrative state, but even more to make law-
makers and policy makers accountable to the people.”). 
 246. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 199, 
210 (1887) (quoting Hegel and Stein, respectively, though the quotation from 
Stein is not attributed); see Fritz Sager & Christian Rosser, Weber, Wilson, and 
Hegel: Theories of Modern Bureaucracy, 69 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 1136 (2009) (out-
lining the influence of Hegel’s public administration theory on Wilson). 
 247. Wilson, supra note 246, at 216. 
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the principle that the people have a right to look into such matters and 
control them . . . .248 
Progressives like Wilson therefore presumed agencies would 
implement the laws in ways that touched on great principles of 
law and politics, but insisted they do so in dialogue with affected 
persons. Dewey similarly stressed that “in the absence of an ar-
ticulate voice on the part of the masses, . . . the wise cease to be 
wise,” because it is impossible for administrative experts “to se-
cure a monopoly of such knowledge as must be used for the reg-
ulation of common affairs.”249 Thus, 
[n]o government by experts in which the masses do not have a chance 
to inform the experts as to their needs can be anything but an oligarchy 
managed in the interests of the few. And the enlightenment must pro-
ceed in a way which forces the administrative specialist to take account 
of the needs.250 
This democratic vision of administration was part and par-
cel of a reconceptualization of the state itself. Dewey defined the 
state as a “public articulated.”251 The public emerged from exter-
nalities caused by economic activity. But without a forum in 
which to express its problems, the public was “unorganized and 
formless.”252 In the state, the diffuse public became institution-
ally embodied and empowered by political institutions. Adminis-
trative agencies were then not merely the best technical means 
for realizing clearly identified purposes, but were also part and 
parcel of the process by which such purposes were identified.253 
This democratic notion of the state gave administrative 
agencies a central role to play in the deliberative process, rather 
than placing them completely outside of politics as an efficient 
instrument for realizing democratic will.254 Dewey thus argued 
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on the eve of the New Deal that “The problem of social control of 
industry and the use of governmental agencies for constructive 
social ends will become the avowed centre of political strug-
gle.”255 Administrative agencies would not merely be means for 
implementing the results of political struggles waged in other 
settings, but would provide additional processes in which to 
reach provisional settlements over common policy goals. 
Legislation had an important but not exclusive role in guid-
ing administrative agencies. The Progressives acknowledged the 
special representative competency of Congress, and thus under-
stood the scope of agency action to be framed by legislative en-
actment. Frank Goodnow, who was also influenced by Hegelian 
conceptions of administration, distinguished between legislation 
as the expression of democratic will and execution as the deed 
which carried out this will.256 He concluded that “popular gov-
ernment requires that it is the executing authority which shall 
be subordinated to the expressing authority, since the latter in 
the nature of things can be made much more representative of 
the people than can the executing authority.”257 As the “body 
representative of public opinion,” the legislature had to serve as 
“the regulator of administration.”258 
But the Progressives did not believe that administrative ac-
tion was completely determined by the statutory authority under 
which it acted. As Wilson argued, “[t]he scope of Administration 
is . . . largely defined and regulated and always limited . . . by 
the laws, to which it is of course subject; but serving the State, 
not the law-making body in the State, and possessing a life not 
resident in statutes.”259 While agencies were bound by law, they 
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served the broader democratic purposes of the state structure as 
a whole, which might be expressed in forms other than statutory 
enactment. Public participation in the administrative process 
provided another source of democratic input into administrative 
activity, which would enable administrators to interpret the am-
biguous provisions of law by reference to the self-understandings 
of the democratic public itself. 
Another source of democratic input was the President. The 
Progressives were eager to deploy the democratic mandate of the 
President to energize and to guide the administrative state they 
envisioned.260 But they did not believe the President should dic-
tate the outcome of administrative proceedings or exercise full 
and pervasive control over the administrative apparatus. Good-
now stated: 
While . . . in the interest of securing the execution of the state will, pol-
itics should have a control over administration, in the interest both of 
popular government and efficient administration, that control should 
not be permitted to extend beyond the limits necessary in order that 
the legitimate purpose of its existence be fulfilled.261 
In Goodnow’s view, the political views of the President and his 
appointees legitimately entered into the broad determination of 
administrative policy.262 But complete political control of the ad-
ministrative apparatus would undermine the impartiality and 
efficiency of administrative decision-making.263 
Wilson likewise argued that the President could serve as a 
“spokesman for the real sentiment and purpose of the country, 
by giving direction to opinion, by giving the country at once the 
information and the statements of policy which will enable it to 
form its judgments alike of parties and of men.”264 He would 
therefore steer administration by bringing his understanding of 
public opinion to bear on administrative activity. But Wilson in-
sisted that, “as legal executive, his constitutional aspect, the 
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President cannot be thought of alone.”265 He would delegate to 
his cabinet and the agencies substantial authority to specify the 
contents of public policy in consultation with affected groups.266  
In this Progressive understanding of the state, judicial re-
view would take a fairly restrained form.267 Frank Goodnow ar-
gued that “efficient administrative action . . . is often impaired 
either by the necessity of judicial process or by the extensive ju-
dicial control over administrative action.”268 Acknowledging that 
this intensive control had been justified by the “informality of 
existing administrative procedure,” he hoped that: 
When we develop an administrative procedure which is reasonably re-
gardful of private rights, e.g. gives notice and a hearing to the person 
affected by the administrative determination, it may well be that the 
courts will change their attitude and come to the conclusion that the 
changed and complex conditions of modern life . . . should have an ef-
fect both on the constitutional rights of individuals and on the powers 
and procedure of administrative authorities.269 
Goodnow therefore believed that internal administrative proce-
dures, rather than external judicial review, could adequately 
protect private rights and guarantee conformity with law. This 
suggestion dovetailed with Wilson’s and Dewey’s proposals for 
administrative proceedings that would bring public opinion to 
bear on administrative deliberations. Such procedures would be 
both more efficient and more democratic than judicial adjudica-
tion. Administrative, rather than judicial, institutions would be 
the primary venue for interpreting public purposes left ambigu-
ous by legislative enactment. 
C. THE INFLUENCE OF THE PROGRESSIVE THEORY THROUGH 
THE NEW DEAL 
This democratic theory of administration corresponded to 
developments in legal scholarship and administrative practice 
during the Progressive Era and through the New Deal. Under 
the influence of German conceptions of the state, constitutional 
lawyers such as W.W. Willoughby began to conceive of the na-
tional government as the ultimate source of law, understanding 
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legislation as the primary expression of the will of the state.270 
In keeping with the Progressives’ revolt against legal formalism, 
Roscoe Pound assailed the Lochner Court’s “mechanical juris-
prudence,” which had challenged the early development of social 
welfare regulation in the United States.271 Pound embraced in-
stead a Hegelian-inspired “sociological jurisprudence” that 
would be responsive to the cultural context, historical develop-
ment, political purpose, and practical effects of law rather than 
categorical conceptions of natural right.272 All of these develop-
ments untethered law from judicial common law and related it 
more closely both to the legislature and the popular understand-
ings it was meant to capture. 
Administrative practice at the same time began to develop 
participatory procedures. Agencies like the Forest Service began 
to include the public in the administrative process “to reach out 
for the more timid and modest opinions, and for the sifting of the 
bolder and more aggressive types.”273 The Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) invited industry representatives to comment on 
trade practices, which complaints had alleged to be unfair.274 
Progressive administrators under Woodrow Wilson sought to 
protect freedom of conscience during World War I through “indi-
vidualized involvement in the administrative state.”275  
The Progressives’ theory of administration served as the ide-
ological ferment for the New Deal. In 1927, Felix Frankfurter 
relied on the “pioneer scholarship” of Goodnow to argue that ad-
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ministrative law was of crucial importance to democratic govern-
ance and individual liberty.276 Statutory programs advancing 
democratic goals were “conditioned upon rules and regulations 
emanating from enforcing authorities.”277 Recognizing that 
broad statutory delegations left important details to the policy 
judgment of agencies, he emphasized that these “‘details’ are of 
the essence; they give meaning and content to vague con-
tours.”278 In Frankfurter’s view, the surest protection for demo-
cratic constitutionalism in the administrative state would not be 
to retain detailed legislative control, but instead to govern ad-
ministration through a professional civil service, a “spirited bar,” 
and “easy access to public scrutiny.”279 Frankfurter thus pre-
sumed that agencies would deal with essential questions of eco-
nomic and political significance, and sought to ensure demo-
cratic control through a combination of bureaucratic 
professionalism, adversarial legalism, and public input. 
The vast expansion of administrative capacities during the 
New Deal would follow in this Progressive tradition. Under the 
influence of Dewey’s conception of democratic administration, 
agencies like the Tennessee Valley Authority280 and more radi-
cal forms of democratic planning in agriculture,281 aimed to in-
volve the affected public in administrative deliberation over 
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planning.282 New Deal administrative-law scholars like Walter 
Gellhorn argued that such Progressive forms of participatory ad-
ministration served to “democratize our governmental pro-
cesses,” by giving “the interests and individuals immediately af-
fected an opportunity to shape the course of regulation.”283 The 
APA codified the Progressive innovation of public participation 
with its notice-and-comment rulemaking provisions, which re-
quired agencies to receive and respond to comments when they 
proposed substantive rules.284 
The Progressive theory that lay the foundation for the New 
Deal has been obscured because of subsequent political and in-
tellectual developments. In the wake of war with Nazi Germany 
and in the midst of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the 
threat of totalitarian government undermined the legitimacy of 
administrative government in the United States.285 The Progres-
sive ideal of an administrative state that would act on the basis 
of public deliberation was then supplanted with theories of in-
terest-group pluralism, which treated administration as a bar-
gaining process between private interests.286 The subsequent 
rise of cost-benefit analysis as a hegemonic framework for policy 
reasoning displaced the Progressive notion that the state might 
further values other than market efficiency, such as equality and 
positive liberty.287 
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We have therefore largely lost sight of the original Progres-
sive intent that animated the project of American state-building. 
To be sure, the Progressives’ emphasis on deliberative adminis-
trative action persists in civic-republican theories of the admin-
istrative state.288 Like the Progressives, contemporary civic re-
publicans argue that administrative agencies are uniquely 
situated to conduct value-oriented policy discourse.289 But civic 
republicanism has not retained the Progressives’ complemen-
tary concern with administrative autonomy from judicial con-
trol. The Progressives did not merely want to foster public par-
ticipation in administrative agencies. Participation was a means 
to furnish the legal and material requisites for a democratic so-
ciety. Civic-republican theories often ignore the possibility that 
“output legitimacy” can complement the procedural legitimacy 
that arises from reasoned public discourse.290 
There are trade-offs between these two aspects of Progres-
sivism. Soliciting and responding to public comments in a com-
prehensive, reasoned fashion takes time and resources that 
could otherwise be spent on the delivery of the relevant ser-
vices.291 As the intensity of judicial review of agency reasoning 
increases, so too do these costs.292 For this reason, the Progres-
sive state must balance the need to maximize deliberation 
against the need to maximize efficient bureaucratic perfor-
mance. Civic republicans do not adequately attend to this coun-
tervailing concern with bureaucratic autonomy. Cass Sunstein, 
for example, has argued for stringent judicial review of adminis-
trative action to ensure agencies act rationally and in the public 
interests.293 This approach does not take seriously the costs that 
such intensive review incurs for bureaucratic efficiency, nor the 
risk that the political inclinations of reviewing courts may im-
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properly influence or limit the exercise of administrative discre-
tion. The Progressives, by contrast, were wary of judicial over-
reach, because they believed that courts would unduly constrain 
the exercise of public power in order to protect private inter-
ests.294  
I am suggesting here that we should give this original un-
derstanding of the administrative state a second look. The Pro-
gressives conceived of agencies as engaging the democratic pub-
lic in three ways: (1) through the implementation of 
democratically enacted law; (2) through the input of the Presi-
dent; and (3) through deliberation with the affected public.295 
They presumed that agencies would tackle ethically charged po-
litical questions, but they aimed to ensure that they would do so 
in a rational and inclusive fashion. At the same time, they rec-
ognized that the extent of public participation would need to be 
balanced against the requirements of efficient state action.296 
They were skeptical that the courts were the best forum in which 
to ensure the democratic integrity of government, and thus 
sought to enhance the democratic credentials of the administra-
tive process itself.297 
V.  SUPERIORITY OF THE PROGRESSIVE THEORY TO 
THE WEBERIAN, COURT-CENTRIC THEORY   
In this Part, I argue that the Progressive theory of the state 
maps onto important aspects of our current institutional struc-
ture better than the Weberian, court-centric theory that sup-
ports the major questions doctrine. Despite the fact that the Pro-
gressive understanding of the state has largely faded from 
memory, its institutional legacy of remains. The Progressive the-
ory acknowledges that agencies resolve important value ques-
tions, while still respecting public participation and presidential 
oversight as sources of democratic legitimacy. In our current ad-
ministrative state, agencies do indeed frequently make decisions 
that implicate important political, constitutional, and ethical 
values. But we also have procedures that ensure that the agency 
deliberates with the affected public when it settles such major 
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questions. In Section A, I note numerous instances where agen-
cies address questions of economic and political significance, 
which suggests that the major questions doctrine conflicts with 
a significant aspect of administrative practice. In Section B, I ar-
gue that the President provides additional democratic authority 
to agency statutory interpretation, which can bolster agencies’ 
claims to address major questions. In Section C, I argue that 
public input in the rulemaking process provides further demo-
cratic support for administrative interpretations, especially com-
pared with a realistic assessment of the democratic credentials 
of Congress and the courts. 
A. THE AGENCY PRACTICE OF VALUE-ORIENTED STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
The Progressives anticipated that administrative agencies 
would not only identify efficient means to achieve statutory ends, 
but also engage in a deeper normative inquiry about the mean-
ing of those statutory ends in light of broader public norms. Our 
current institutions reflect this vision. In the post–New Deal 
context, where Congress routinely delegates broad rulemaking 
power to administrative agencies, agencies will often engage 
with fraught and profound questions of public philosophy when 
they interpret and implement the law. To note a few famous ex-
amples: the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administra-
tion’s travails with passive restraint requirements for auto 
safety were bound up with deeply rooted American sensibilities 
about motor vehicles as embodiments of individual autonomy.298 
The Department of Transportation’s (DOT) approval of highway 
routes implicated the relative importance of park conservation, 
racial equity, and local economic development.299 The Supreme 
Court’s development of the theory of disparate-impact discrimi-
nation relied upon the interpretations of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC),300 which were grounded in 
the EEOC’s considered position that discrimination included not 
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only intentional bigotry, but also a “condition of pervasive exclu-
sion.”301 Decisions by the IRS on tax exemptions,302 and the FCC 
decisions on rate increases,303 have interpreted constitutional 
norms of equal protection and statutory norms of gender and ra-
cial equality. 
It would be too much to say that questions of political value 
arise in every administrative action. But nor are such instances 
anomalous. Scholarship on administrative constitutionalism 
identifies numerous cases where agencies explicitly interpret 
constitutional norms, implicitly interpret constitutional norms 
through statutory interpretation, implement statutes that have 
come to assume a quasi-constitutional status, or develop new un-
derstandings of foundational public norms in the course of per-
forming their statutory duties.304 When agency interpretations 
concern constitutional norms, or more broadly address social 
problems that have drawn intense public interest, they plainly 
address questions of deep economic and political significance. In 
doing so, they mediate between the legal and the political pro-
cess. As Jerry Mashaw argues, agencies routinely take into ac-
count “political struggles and political context” in their interpre-
tation of statutes, since “agency use of this ‘political’ material is 
a part of maintaining their democratic legitimacy. It is precisely 
their job as agents of past congresses and sitting politicians to 
synthesize the past with the present.”305 Administrative policy-
making is therefore not a technocratic exercise in statutory gap-
filling, but a politically engaged effort to shape the meaning of 
underdetermined legal norms. 
The major questions doctrine’s presumption that Congress 
does not intend agencies to make such decisions thus flies in the 
face of a common aspect of agency practice. If rigorously imple-
mented, the doctrine would prevent agencies from playing the 
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important role they have played to-date in advancing our under-
standing of the abstract legal commitments established by stat-
ute. 
B. PRESIDENTIAL OVERSIGHT OF AGENCY STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
The Progressives argued that the President has authority as 
a spokesperson for public opinion to guide administrative imple-
mentation of statutory mandates.306 At the same time, the Pro-
gressives did not advocate direct presidential control over ad-
ministrative decision-making, aiming to separate the 
administration of the law from short-term partisan policy pref-
erences.307 Our case law and institutional arrangements reflect 
this vision to a significant degree. In Chevron, the Court explic-
itly acknowledged that the President has an important, consti-
tutionally authorized role to play in shaping administrative ac-
tion: 
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Ex-
ecutive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the 
Government to make such policy choices—resolving the competing in-
terests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or 
intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the admin-
istration of the statute in light of everyday realities.308 
This aspect of the reasoning in Chevron mirrors the Progres-
sives’ conception of the important role the President plays in 
guiding administrative discretion according to his interpretation 
of public opinion. 
Chevron’s emphasis on presidential input has been comple-
mented by the growth of regulatory review in the Office of Infor-
mation and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). Though this process be-
gan during the Reagan Administration as an antiregulatory 
effort to restrict administrative output,309 it has evolved since 
then into a more sensitive process. Under the Obama Admin-
istration, the public values the President endorsed—such as “eq-
uity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts”—can be 
invoked by agencies to justify their regulatory course of action.310 
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Since executive agencies are required to submit any regulation 
that has an economic impact of $100,000,000 or more to OIRA 
for review,311 as well as any guidance document with a similar 
effect,312 most agency interpretations that a court could plausi-
bly construe as implicating a major question must be approved 
by the White House. This means that most administrative an-
swers to major questions will have the imprimatur of presiden-
tial approval,313 and consequently will benefit from the demo-
cratic credentials of the office. The practice of presidential 
control in this respect furthers the Progressive ambition of guid-
ing administration according to the President’s distillation of 
public opinion. 
The Trump Administration has retained the basic regula-
tory review framework developed under the Clinton and Obama 
Administrations.314 Other aspects of its regulatory review pro-
cess, however, fundamentally conflict with the ideals of the Pro-
gressive state. Executive Order 13,771 requires administrative 
agencies to rescind two rules for every one they promulgate.315 
It also requires that “the total incremental cost of all new regu-
lations . . . be no greater than zero.”316 The Executive Order in 
this way commands aggressive deregulation, failing even to take 
into account the benefits of regulations. Furthermore, it under-
mines rational deliberation with affected parties over the extent 
and nature of regulation. If an agency is subject to a strict, nu-
merical mandate to repeal more rules than they promulgate, and 
to create no additional economic costs, they are unlikely to en-
gage in a substantive debate over the merits of current and pro-
posed policies. Executive Order 13,771 is thus a product of the 
 
 311. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 
5 U.S.C. § 601 at 638–42 (2000). 
 312. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. and Budget, 
to the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Mar. 
4, 2009), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/ 
memoranda/2009/m09-13.pdf. 
 313. Independent agencies are not covered by regulatory review. Exec. Order 
No. 12,866, § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 601 at 639 (2000). 
 314. Exec. Order No. 13,777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Feb. 24, 2017) (ordering 
the “implementation of regulatory reform initiatives” including Executive Order 
12866 and Executive Order 13563). 
 315. Exec. Order No. 13,771, § 2, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017). 
 316. Id. at § 2(b). 
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Trump Administration’s attempt to “deconstruct[] . . . the ad-
ministrative state.”317 It aims to supplant pluralistic and rea-
soned argumentation over the means and ends of administrative 
action with a single and overriding drive to reduce the quantity 
and cost of federal rules. Whether that project succeeds may de-
pend, in part, on whether courts, lawyers, scholars, and the pub-
lic at large adequately recognize and defend the democratic con-
ception of administration advanced and institutionalized by the 
Progressives. 
The Progressive theory of the state did not identify demo-
cratic legitimacy with presidential control of administration. Re-
call that Wilson argued that the President should guide admin-
istration according to his understanding of public opinion, but 
give significant policy autonomy to agency heads and adminis-
trative judgment.318 Unlike contemporary proponents of the uni-
tary executive,319 the Progressives did not maintain that the 
President should dictate how administrative agencies would im-
plement the laws.320 Instead, the Progressives sought to con-
strain presidential influence with statutory guidance, adminis-
trative autonomy, and public participation. The Progressive 
theory therefore would not go as far as Kathryn Watts in assert-
ing that the President may dictate the course of administrative 
action based on articulated policy preferences.321 Rather, given 
its respect for the legislature as the preeminent representative 
of public opinion,322 the Progressive theory better comports with 
Kevin Stack’s understanding of presidential administration: if 
an agency to which Congress has delegated rulemaking author-
ity wishes a court to credit the President’s position in determin-
ing the democratic credentials of its statutory interpretations, 
this input must be presented in a way that is consonant with the 
 
 317. Philip Rucker & Robert Costa, Bannon Vows a Daily Fight for “Decon-
struction of the Administrative State,” WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/politics/top-wh-strategist-vows-a-daily-fight-for 
-deconstruction-of-the-administrative-state/2017/02/23/03f6b8da-f9ea-11e6 
-bf01-d47f8cf9b643_story.html. 
 318. See supra Part IV.B. 
 319. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s 
Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 570–99 (1994); Christopher S. 
Yoo, et al., The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945–2004, 90 IOWA L. 
REV. 601, 730–31 (2005). 
 320. See Skowronek, supra note 260, at 2087–92. 
 321. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Ca-
pricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 57–60 (2009). 
 322. See supra notes 256–59 and accompanying text. 
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statute’s purposes.323 This approach ensures the deliberative in-
tegrity of administrative policymaking by anchoring all input—
from the President, political appointees, congressional commit-
tees, civil servants, and members of the public—to the common 
reference point of statutory goals. More extreme forms of execu-
tive control risk displacing reasoned, participatory discourse 
about the meaning of the law with the mere assertions of the 
“will of the President,” exercising “authority without law.”324 
This Progressive vision comports to a large degree with the 
law and organizational structure of the executive branch. As Pe-
ter Strauss has argued, the President is best understood as an 
“overseer” of administration, rather than a “decider” of admin-
istrative policy.325 The President and his agents may legiti-
mately influence administrative policymaking through contacts 
with agency officials.326 But the President has no independent 
and inherent lawmaking power.327 Legislation may delegate 
quasi-legislative function to his office,328 but frequently will in-
stead delegate such powers directly to another executive official 
or administrative body.329 In these cases, because the regulatory 
power is vested in another actor, there is a strong case to be 
made that the President’s policy preference does not have bind-
ing authority upon that actor.330 
 
 323. See Stack, supra note 190, at 925–27. 
 324. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
 325. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Ad-
ministrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007). 
 326. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“[W]e 
do not believe that Congress intended that the courts convert informal rulemak-
ing into a rarified technocratic process, unaffected by political considerations or 
the presence of Presidential power.”). But the President may not generally in-
terfere in adjudicative proceedings affecting the rights of private parties, Myers 
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926), or intervene ex parte where adminis-
trative policymaking is to be made through methods of formal adjudication, 
Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1540 
(9th Cir. 1993). 
 327. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. 
 328. Id. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 329. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §7409(a) (2012) (“The Administrator [of the EPA] 
. . . shall by regulation promulgate . . . proposed national primary and secondary 
ambient air quality standards . . . .”). 
 330. Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Deci-
sionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 465–72 (1987); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 181, 201 (1986); see Myers, 272 U.S. at 135 (“[T]here may be duties 
so peculiarly and specifically committed to the discretion of a particular officer 
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As a practical matter, the President can exert great pressure 
on agency heads who serve at his pleasure. And such appointees 
are, in any event, likely to share the President’s political per-
spective on many issues. But because the President may incur 
political costs for removing an administrative leader for failure 
to implement his preferred policy, and must, for most leadership 
posts, secure Senate confirmation,331 his control even over exec-
utive departments is not absolute.332 When it comes to “inde-
pendent” commissions, such as the SEC or the FCC, whose com-
missioners can only be removed for cause, his control is more 
attenuated.333 Perhaps more importantly, civil-service protec-
tions prevent political appointees from simply dictating policy 
outcomes that run afoul of tenured officials’ conception of their 
legal obligations and rational public policy.334 As Jon Michaels 
argues, administrative agencies are not unitary, purely hierar-
chical actors working at the behest of their political leadership; 
rather, they institutionalize an internal separation of powers be-
tween political officials, civil servants, and civil-society 
groups.335 
The Progressive theory of presidential influence thus com-
ports with significant aspects of current administrative law and 
executive practice. The President is a powerful spokesperson for 
public opinion, who can legitimately influence the administra-
tive process. At the same time, both the Progressive theory and 
current constitutional and statutory law insulate administration 
from total, pervasive, and direct presidential control. The major 
questions doctrine eschews this moderate position, ignoring 
presidential influence altogether. For example, in Brown & Wil-
liamson, it did not matter to the Court that the President had 
 
as to raise a question whether the President may overrule or revise the officer ’s 
interpretation of his statutory duty in a particular instance.”); Kendall v. United 
States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838) (finding that the President 
does not have power to instruct an executive official not to perform a statutory 
duty). For the contrary argument, see Kagan, supra note 39, at 2320–31. 
 331. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 332. See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 330, at 200. 
 333. See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 607 (1935) 
(“[T]he duties and function of the Federal Trade Commission are inconsistent 
with an unrestricted power of removal in the President.”). 
 334. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation 
of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 586 (1984). 
 335. See Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Ri-
vals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 227, 238–39 (2016). 
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taken public ownership of the Agency’s decision to regulate to-
bacco.336 Rather, in the major questions cases, the Court narrows 
its focus to legislative control alone, while ignoring the possibil-
ity that administrative agencies might draw deliberative demo-
cratic authority from presidential input. 
C. AGENCY DELIBERATION WITH THE AFFECTED PUBLIC 
The Progressives’ theory of administration goes well beyond 
presidential accountability. More importantly, it maintains that 
the public at large must be involved in the administrative pro-
cess to ensure its democratic legitimacy. Our current institutions 
reflect this to a significant degree, though problems remain. The 
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure codified by the APA 
institutionalizes the Progressive concern for public participation 
in agency policymaking. In this rulemaking process, agencies 
must publish any proposed rule in the Federal Register, and 
then “give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the 
rule making” through written submissions.337 As Kenneth Culp 
Davis described:  
[This process is] one of the greatest inventions of modern govern-
ment. . . . Affected parties who know facts that the agency may not 
know or who have ideas or understanding that the agency may not 
share have opportunity by quick and easy means to transmit the facts, 
ideas, or understandings to the agency at the crucial time when the 
agency’s positions are still fluid. The procedure is both democratic and 
efficient.338 
The claim here is that notice-and-comment rulemaking can 
parallel the legislative process “in microcosm” by creating a de-
liberative process between agency officials and the affected pub-
lic.339 As the Court recognized in Mead, notice-and-comment pro-
cedures tend to “foster . . . fairness and deliberation.”340 Courts 
then police this process to ensure that agencies draw reasonable 
conclusions from the comments they receive, address all signifi-
 
 336. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 330, at 2283 (describing how the FDA col-
laborated with the White House to prepare a final rule on tobacco regulation). 
 337. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012). 
 338. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 142 (3d ed. 1972). 
 339. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1712 (1975). 
 340. United States v. Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2178 (2001).  
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cant comments, and ensure that all major policy choices are suf-
ficiently “ventilated.”341 This democratic function of notice-and-
comment rulemaking was succinctly summarized by Judge 
McGowan of the D.C. Circuit in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle: “[I]f 
the Agency, in carrying out its essentially legislative task, has 
infused the administrative process with the degree of openness, 
explanation, and participatory democracy required by the APA, 
it will thereby have negate[d] the dangers of arbitrariness and 
irrationality in the formulation of rules.”342 Notice-and-comment 
rulemaking is therefore capable of institutionalizing the Ameri-
can Progressives’ core concern of developing a participatory ad-
ministrative process. The procedure may help to engage the af-
fected public in grappling with questions of political value that 
have not been unambiguously settled by legislative enactment. 
To be sure, the notice-and-comment procedure is not an 
ideal deliberative process. The comment period itself may be a 
kind of “Kabuki theater,” in the sense that it is “a highly stylized 
process for displaying in a formal way the essence of something 
which in real life takes place in other venues,”343 such as infor-
mal consultations. Even though notice-and-comment is stylized, 
however, the underlying dynamics of deliberative engagement 
are no less real. The default participation requirements for rule-
making in the APA formalize, and render judicially reviewable, 
a broader process of stakeholder engagement in our administra-
tive state.344 This process has become even more widely accessi-
ble with the advent of e-rulemaking, which allows anyone with 
 
 341. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 53–57 (1983) (holding that the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration did not adequately explain why it rescinded a former safety re-
quirement); Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d. 330, 338 (D.C. 
Cir. 1968) (“[T]he ‘concise general statement of basis and purpose’ . . . will ena-
ble us to see what major issues of policy were ventilated by the informal pro-
ceedings . . . .”); see also United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 
F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977) (“It is not in keeping with the rational process to 
leave vital questions, raised by comments which are of cogent materiality, com-
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 342. 590 F.2d 1011, 1027–28 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (internal quotations omitted). 
 343. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L. J. 1490, 1492 
(1992). 
 344. See generally William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in 
Administrative Law—Three Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 
171 (2009) (describing the evolution and deepening of public participation in 
administration); Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making 
Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & 
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an Internet connection to submit a comment on proposed 
rules.345 American administrative law requires a much higher 
level of judicially reviewable public participation in rulemaking 
than other liberal democracies, such as the United Kingdom, 
Germany, and the European Union as a whole.346  
The major questions doctrine does not even acknowledge 
that agencies engage in this uniquely American deliberative-
democratic process. With its exclusive emphasis on legislation as 
a source of democratic accountability, the major questions doc-
trine denies these aspects of the rulemaking process entirely. In 
doing so, the Court blinds itself to sources of popular input that 
may legitimate an administrative agency’s economically or polit-
ically significant policy choice. The problem with the doctrine is 
therefore not merely that it undermines “expertise” and “ac-
countability,” as Cass Sunstein argues,347 but that it discounts 
and short-circuits rational public deliberation between adminis-
trative officials and the public at large. 
It might be argued that, because of significant inequalities 
of participation and influence in the administrative process,348 
participatory rulemaking does not add any democratic legiti-
macy to administrative interpretations of statutes. But the dem-
ocratic credentials of the administrative process must be under-
stood in comparison to the other institutions that might resolve 
 
THEORY 245 (1998) (finding varying levels of public interest engagement in 
rulemaking). 
 345. Cary Coglianese, E-Rulemaking: Information Technology and the Reg-
ulatory Process, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 355 (2004). 
 346. See, e.g., Catherine Donnelly, Participation and Expertise: Judicial At-
titudes in Comparative Perspective, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 370, 
370–74 (Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Lindseth, & Blake Emerson, eds., 2d 
ed. 2017) (finding a much stronger emphasis on public participation in U.S. ad-
ministrative law than in the United Kingdom and European Union); SUSAN 
ROSE-ACKERMAN, CONTROLLING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: THE LIMITS OF PUB-
LIC LAW IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 10 (1995) (comparing the United 
States’ relatively participatory rulemaking process to Germany’s corporatist 
and largely unreviewable rulemaking procedure). 
 347. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 243. 
 348. See, e.g., Wendy Warner, et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical 
Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emissions Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 141 (2011) 
(“[A]t least some publicly important rules . . . may be influenced heavily by reg-
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son Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing 
Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128 (2006) (finding 
that business commenters have important influence over the content of final 
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major questions. Inequality of influence is, unfortunately, en-
demic to our entire political process, including Congress.349 If 
significant degrees of inequality of public influence were com-
pletely fatal to democratic legitimacy, Congress would have no 
democratic authority to legislate. The major questions doctrine 
would therefore not serve a democratic function by incentivizing 
Congress to resolve major policy disputes. 
Moreover, the major questions doctrine gives the judiciary 
the primary responsibility to settle major questions if the statu-
tory text is ambiguous. Especially in a context where Congress 
is not likely to correct the judiciary’s interpretation of a major 
ambiguity,350 the doctrine functions to empower the courts, ra-
ther than Congress. Courts, however, are facially less well-
suited than Congress to promote democratic forms of participa-
tion. Their constitutional function is to adjudicate cases and con-
troversies, and protect the rights of individuals and minorities, 
rather than to settle polycentric policy-disputes.351 Limits on 
standing to challenge administrative action also create inequal-
ities of judicial access between regulated parties and public-in-
terest organizations, since public-interest organizations have 
more difficulty showing a concrete and particularized injury 
 
 349. See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE 259 (2008) (finding that Senators are twice 
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 350. Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Administrative Law Without 
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icy questions, involving multiple considerations and parties, which are best set-
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nin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation 
of Powers, 17 SUFF. U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983) (“[T]he law of standing roughly 
restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protecting individuals 
and minorities against impositions of the majority . . . .”). 
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than does the regulated community.352 Because the major ques-
tions doctrine merely empowers the judiciary, rather than Con-
gress or agencies, to resolve major questions, it does not promote 
a comparatively more democratic form of policymaking than 
would exist absent the doctrine’s constraint on administrative 
discretion.  
Worse still, the major questions doctrine exacerbates ine-
qualities in rulemaking rather than redressing them. Because 
the doctrine generally forbids agencies from making decisions of 
great economic and political significance, it encourages agencies 
to explain themselves in technocratic terms, even if significant 
questions of value are at issue. If agencies know that courts will 
decline to defer to them if they detect agency consideration of 
important questions of political value, they will invariably ex-
plain their interpretations of statutory ambiguities in a way that 
makes them appear purely technical. Inequalities of influence 
are at their height when rulemaking concerns such apparently 
technical, rather than normative, questions, because regulated 
groups tend to have the most nuts-and-bolts information about 
the relevant subject matter.353 The technocratic method of re-
view established by State Farm already encourages agencies to 
explain themselves in value-neutral, quasi-scientific policy dis-
course, which is difficult for the lay public to access, participate 
in, and influence.354 The major questions doctrine doubles down 
on this trend by barring agencies from engaging in anything 
more than interstitial gap-filling between clearly established 
statutory norms. The doctrine, thus, is likely to increase inequal-
ities in the rulemaking process, shifting it into a technocratic ra-
ther than value-oriented form of policy discourse. This retreat 
 
 352. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577–78 (1992) (limit-
ing standing for persons and groups who are not the object of the challenged 
government action, and finding “citizen suit” statutory standing as insufficient 
to confer Article III standing). Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? 
Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 163, 221 (1992) 
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 353. Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information 
Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1379 (2010) (noting that regulated industries have 
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and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORD. L. REV. 17, 29 (2001) (de-
scribing the form of reason-giving courts expect of agencies as “too cramped” 
and “too narrow,” and thus sometimes failing “to respect our humanity”). 
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into technocracy will further imperil democratic transparency, 
because important value choices will be kept from public view, 
and dressed up in the supposedly neutral language of expertise. 
The citizenry will then find itself alienated from the discourse in 
which its interests are supposedly expressed and advanced. 
D. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE AS AN OBSTACLE TO 
EFFICIENT PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
The previous Sections have shown that the major questions 
doctrine imperils democratic legitimacy by ignoring public par-
ticipation in, and presidential oversight of, the administrative 
process. This doctrine also undermines democracy in the more 
basic sense that it can stymie efficient bureaucratic perfor-
mance. Recall that the Progressives were motivated to build and 
legitimate an administrative state because they wanted to fur-
nish the requisites for public freedom, as understood by the peo-
ple themselves.355 They believed that administrative agencies 
had the institutional capacity to bring governmental power to 
bear efficiently and on a massive scale to further social emanci-
pation.356 By contrast, the major questions doctrine shows the 
perils of privileging judicial control without due regard for this 
practical need of speedy administrative resolution of social prob-
lems. In Brown & Williamson, the FDA, with its tobacco and cig-
arette regulations, was attempting to mitigate a public health 
crisis which caused the deaths of roughly 400,000 Americans 
every year.357 The Court acknowledged the force of this concern, 
but nonetheless struck down the rule as outside of the Agency’s 
statutory authority.358 In this instance, the laudable concern 
with ensuring that the public effectively deliberates over the 
commitments that guide state action delayed an urgent inter-
vention into a serious public health issue. Cases like this suggest 
that the major questions exception has not struck an appropriate 
balance between deliberative integrity and efficient protection of 
the public interest. 
 
* * * * * 
The Progressive conception of the state thus comports with 
salient and normatively significant aspects of our current state 
 
 355. See Wood, supra note 236. 
 356. See Anderson, supra note 253. 
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 358. Id. at 161. 
 2018] MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE 2087 
 
structure in a way that the major questions doctrine and its at-
tending political theory do not. Agencies engage with conven-
tional sources of statutory interpretation, alongside a wider set 
of politically sensitive tools that serve the same underlying pur-
pose: to articulate public opinion in the form of political action. 
Unless courts respect the wide ambit of agencies’ deliberative 
and interpretive competencies, they are liable to frustrate, ra-
ther than bolster, the democratic credentials of the state as a 
whole. 
VI.  REFORMING MAJOR QUESTIONS   
The major questions doctrine rests on the important consti-
tutional principle that basic value choices should be subject to 
public input, scrutiny, and critique. But it then imports other 
auxiliary assumptions to conclude that the best way to enforce 
such a deliberative process is for courts to presume that Con-
gress would not delegate such questions to agencies. The doc-
trine assumes that the judiciary is the preeminent interpreter of 
Congress’s choices of principle and policy, and that agencies 
should be restricted to the purely instrumental task of imple-
menting these clearly established goals. I have argued that this 
vision of the administrative state is neither descriptively accu-
rate nor normatively appealing. I turned to the American Pro-
gressives’ democratic conception of administration to argue that 
agencies can play an important role in public deliberation about 
value choices. Legislation, in this view, is not the sole legal re-
pository in which public value choices are to be found. Statutes 
are only one important part of a discursive process that specifies 
content of public purposes. 
Chevron acknowledged that many foundational questions of 
policy are simply not determined by statute, and thus must be 
fleshed out with the input of the president, administrators, and 
the affected public. The major questions doctrine shuts out these 
noncongressional and nonstatutory sources of public input and 
accountability, and forces agencies into a purely technocratic 
mode of explanation that belies the normative character of many 
of their determinations. We therefore need a better doctrine—
one that recognizes the important interest in reinforcing demo-
cratic governance in administrative law but does not trade on 
inflated notions of judicial competence and deflated conceptions 
of administrative agencies’ ethical and participatory capacities. 
In Section A, I describe my innovation. In Section B, I apply it to 
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several of the major questions cases: Brown & Williamson, Gon-
zales, King, and Texas v. United States. 
A. A PROPOSAL TO REFORM THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE 
My proposal is this: major questions should be resolved by 
agencies only through interpretive procedures that are respon-
sive to public input on the questions at issue. When a court re-
views an agency interpretation of a statutory ambiguity that 
raises questions of vast economic and political significance, it 
should defer to the agency’s interpretation only if: (1) it was 
promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking, or an-
other procedure of comparable deliberative intensity; and (2) the 
relevant questions of economic and political significance the 
court identifies have been properly “ventilated” in the delibera-
tive process that precedes the promulgation of the interpreta-
tion.359 The rule thus follows United States v. Mead Corp. in 
treating a congressional grant of rulemaking authority as a 
“good indication” that Congress intended to leave the interpre-
tive question to the agency.360 As Jon Michaels observes, Mead 
instructs courts “to accord less deference to unilaterally arrived-
at agency interpretations than to those interpretations that re-
flect the robust participation of agency leaders, civil servants, 
and members of the public.”361 But my proposed approach does 
not, like Mead, treat the agencies’ power to set binding norms as 
the touchstone for assessing the level of deference owed. Even if 
an agency does not have or use rulemaking authority, its opinion 
on major questions within its subject-matter jurisdiction should 
be accorded great weight if its official interpretation meets the 
above criteria of discursive rationality and value ventilation. 
Conversely, an agency would not receive Chevron deference—
even if it did have and use such rulemaking authority—if it did 
not use procedures meeting these same criteria. 
Such a standard would require agencies to state explicitly 
what major questions were at issue, thus heightening the trans-
parency of public decision-making. It would encourage agencies 
always to consider what significant public norms might be in-
volved in their rulemaking, lest a reviewing court deem that the 
issue was in fact one of major significance and fault the agency 
 
 359. See supra note 341 and accompanying text. 
 360. 533 U.S. 218, 228–30 (2001). 
 361. Michaels, supra note 335, at 273. 
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for failing to address the relevant political questions. It would 
also encourage agencies to make significant shifts in policy 
through the rulemaking procedure rather than through inter-
pretive rules or other guidance documents, which can be prom-
ulgated without public input.362 Such interpretations, even if 
promulgated in furtherance of the agencies’ delegated lawmak-
ing authority, would not necessarily qualify for deference if the 
courts found that a major question was at play. Only if agencies 
documented a process of extensive public input over the relevant 
value questions would Chevron deference apply. This approach 
would allow agencies to resolve important policy questions, but 
would insist that they do so in a deliberative, inclusive, and 
transparent fashion. In this way, value-oriented public discourse 
would be reinforced better than it currently is under the major 
questions doctrine’s court-centric, technocracy-forcing approach. 
This proposal is a workable but nonetheless significant mod-
ification of the jurisprudence on agency statutory interpretation. 
Chevron deference applies not only to agency interpretations 
promulgated through rulemaking or adjudication, but some-
times also to other agency interpretations in the exercise of their 
delegated powers.363 In some cases, therefore, an opinion letter 
issued without notice-and-comment receives Chevron defer-
ence.364 In addition, an agency’s interpretation of its own regu-
lations is ordinarily given even more than Chevron deference—
“controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation.”365 This allows agencies to change policy 
without the deliberative benefits of the notice-and-comment pro-
cedure.366 My proposal, by contrast, would only grant deference 
 
 362. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b)(3)(A) (2012). 
 363. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001) (citing Na-
tionsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–
257, 263 (1995)) (“[A]s significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chev-
ron authority, the want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we 
have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such admin-
istrative formality was required and none was afforded.”). 
 364. See NationsBank, 513 U.S. at 256–57. 
 365. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). 
 366. “Auer deference encourages agencies to be ‘vague in framing regula-
tions, with the plan of issuing interpretations to create the intended new law 
without observance of notice and comment procedures.’” Decker v. Nw. Envtl. 
Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 620 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (quoting Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Some-
times They Just Don’t Get It, 10 ADMIN. L. J. 1, 11–12 (1996)). 
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to agency interpretations raising a question of economic or polit-
ical significance if promulgated through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedures, or a process with comparable delibera-
tive features, including: unrestricted access by any and all par-
ties to the decision-making process; agency deliberation which 
rationally responds to all relevant input it receives; and full doc-
umentation of how the agency reached its conclusion in light of 
that deliberation. If an agency’s interpretive rule raises a signif-
icant value question, the interpretation would need to engage 
with and respond to public comments on that question in order 
to be given significant weight by a court.  
For example, the Attorney General’s classification of drugs 
used in physician-assisted suicide in Gonzales would not have 
been owed deference, because it was not promulgated through 
rulemaking or any comparable procedure.367 As the Court noted, 
in the case of the interpretive rule on medications used in as-
sisted suicide, there was an “apparent absence of any consulta-
tion with anyone outside the Department of Justice who might 
aid in a reasoned judgment.”368 This interpretive rule therefore 
lacked any of the trappings of informal rulemaking, and con-
cerned an issue subject to intensive, contemporaneous, and eth-
ically charged public debate. Courts should presume that Con-
gress did not intend an agency to resolve such an important issue 
without extensive and politically substantive public input in the 
administrative process. 
The policy reason for this doctrinal adjustment would be to 
encourage agencies to make use of rulemaking when they make 
significant policy shifts. This approach acknowledges that it 
would be very costly, if not impossible, to prevent agencies from 
determining important questions of policy altogether. The time 
Congress would spend in settling every policy question in one 
domain would be paid for by inattention to other areas that re-
quire legislative attention.369 Nor do courts have the time, insti-
tutional resources, or expertise to settle all of the problems left 
unresolved by the statutory framework.370 It seems necessary, 
 
 367. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258–59 (2005). 
 368. Id. at 269. 
 369. ESKRIDGE, supra note 126, at 936 (“[F]rom an efficiency standpoint, 
Congress lacks the time to resolve innumerable first-order implementation 
questions . . . .”). 
 370. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d. 298, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“We reach 
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therefore, to allow agencies a legitimate role in settling politi-
cally significant questions. My proposed revision to the major 
questions doctrine attempts to ensure that these major adminis-
trative decisions are accompanied by sufficient public delibera-
tion, consultation, and reasoned decision-making. It makes use 
of our existing procedural repertoire to ensure that administra-
tive action remains firmly tethered to an ongoing process of pub-
lic opinion-formation and will-formation. At the same time, it 
does not violate the basic principle of administrative law that 
agencies are generally free to choose which powers to use among 
those that Congress has granted them.371 Instead of mandating 
the use of certain procedures, my approach calibrates the level 
of deference owed to the agency according to the deliberative in-
tensity of the process it elects to use to reach its interpretive con-
clusion. 
The legal justification for this approach is similar to that of 
the major questions doctrine, but applied to the APA itself. 
Courts should interpret the APA in light of a presumption that 
Congress would not allow agencies to make major shifts in policy 
without significant deliberative engagement with the affected 
public. The legislative history of the APA supports this construc-
tion. As the Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee stated in 
describing the Act’s rulemaking provisions, “matters of great im-
port, or those where the public submission of facts will be either 
useful to the agency or a protection to the public, should natu-
rally be accorded more elaborate public procedures”372 than ru-
dimentary notice-and-comment. Congress thus sought to protect 
the under-enforced norm of nondelegation by ensuring that 
agencies make their procedures adequate to the political signifi-
cance of the question presented. While courts may not require 
agencies to use more elaborate procedures than those required 
 
give its thousands of pages. We have adopted a simple and straight-forward 
standard of review, probed the agency’s rationale, studied its references (and 
those of appellants), endeavored to understand them where they were intelligi-
ble (parts were simply impenetrable), and on close questions given the agency 
the benefit of the doubt out of deference for the terrible complexity of its job. We 
are not engineers, computer modelers, economists or statisticians, although 
many of the documents in this record require such expertise—and more.”). 
 371. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he choice made 
between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that 
lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”). 
 372. S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 15 (1945). 
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by the Act,373 they might nonetheless calibrate the level of def-
erence to the deliberative credentials of the rulemaking proceed-
ing. If an agency not only goes through the rudimentary motions 
of notice-and-comment, but gives a particularly thorough expla-
nation of its policy choice that engages with the political contro-
versies it has engendered, the courts ought to respect the 
agency’s interpretation of legislative ambiguities. 
A similar approach might apply to other agency statements 
of policy. Though Congress sought to heighten procedural pro-
tections for significant matters, it also gave agencies the flexibil-
ity to use other policymaking tools besides rulemaking and ad-
judication. When issuing “interpretative rules” or “general 
statements of policy” agencies are not obliged to go through no-
tice-and-comment.374 But this does not mean that such guidance 
documents should always be promulgated without some form of 
public participation and reasoned explanation. The Senate Re-
port on the APA suggested that an agency might “undertake 
public procedures” where it was “useful to them or helpful to the 
public.”375 Similarly, in 2007, the Office of Management and 
Budget required executive agencies to solicit “public comment” 
on “significant guidance documents,” defined as guidance with 
annual economic impacts of $100,000,000 or more or other major 
legal, policy, or budgetary effects.376 This legislative history and 
executive directive provide a framework for analyzing guidance 
documents raising major economic or political questions. The 
twin purposes of procedural protection and regulatory flexibility 
could be balanced by withholding deference to guidance that con-
cerns a major question, unless the agency has elected to promul-
gate such interpretations through a sufficiently deliberative and 
participatory procedure. In this way, courts might disentangle 
the question of the document’s “binding effect” from its legiti-
macy as a product of reasoned and participatory governance.377 
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Under my proposed revision of the major questions doctrine, 
judicial deference to an agency’s resolution of a major question 
would require not only the use of deliberative decision-making 
procedures, but would also require that the relevant economic or 
political questions had been rationally addressed by the agency 
on the record. Such an approach would adapt Chevron’s step two 
into a requirement for deliberative rationality: an agency’s inter-
pretation of an ambiguous provision implicating a major ques-
tion would be reasonable only if it was well-justified in terms of 
the purposes of the statute and the input of affected parties.378 
In other words, a regulation’s “concise general statement of . . . 
basis and purpose”379 would have to discuss the major questions 
at issue, taking into account any relevant concerns raised by 
commenters. This requirement would not be a modification of 
current administrative law doctrine, but merely a straightfor-
ward application of the existing rules to major questions. When, 
in informal rulemaking, an administrative decision-maker “is 
obliged to make policy judgments where no factual certainties 
exist or where facts alone do not provide the answer, he should 
so state and go on to identify the considerations he found per-
suasive.”380 In the context of major questions cases, courts 
should ensure that the agency’s argumentation is not purely 
technical, but actually raises and addresses these questions in 
its final rule. If the agency fails to do so, this will show that the 
agency has not made use of the deliberation-reinforcing capaci-
ties of notice-and-comment rulemaking, and thus cannot claim 
deference for its preferred interpretation of the law.  
 
Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them To Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE 
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B. APPLYING THE APPROACH TO THE MAJOR QUESTIONS CASES 
Consider how this aspect of the test would play out in some 
of the major questions cases discussed in Part I. Since the courts 
do not always specify the economic and political questions at is-
sue, but only allude to the import of the challenged interpreta-
tion, I will attempt to offer a best guess. In the tobacco regula-
tions at issue in Brown & Williamson, one question of political 
significance was arguably: how should the agency balance com-
peting consideration of the public health risk caused by smoking, 
on the one hand, and public values of individual responsibility 
and choice, on the other?381 Responding to public comments on 
this topic, the final rule addressed this question head on: 
[The] FDA believes that adults should continue to have the freedom to 
choose whether or not they will use tobacco products. However, because 
nicotine is addictive, the choice of continuing to smoke, or use smoke-
less tobacco, may not be truly voluntary. Because abundant evidence 
shows that nicotine is addictive and that children are not equipped to 
make a mature choice about using tobacco products, the agency be-
lieves children under age 18 must be protected from this addictive sub-
stance.382 
In the FDA’s 223-page final rule, responding to over 700,000 
comments, the agency addressed other important political ques-
tions such as the relationship between parents, children, and 
federal regulation,383 the allocation of regulatory responsibilities 
between the state and federal government,384 and the commer-
cial rights of retailers.385  
The agency also referenced President Clinton’s Wilsonian 
engagement with the public over the subject matter of the 
rule.386 It considered public comments addressed directly to him 
by a coalition of medical associations,387 remarks to the press ex-
plaining the regulatory plan,388 and the input of the Ad Hoc 
Committee of the President’s Cancer Panel.389 The rule is thus a 
good example of an agency embracing the Progressive conception 
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of the administrative state. The agency deliberated over the pub-
lic norms implicated by the rule, responded in rational fashion 
to a great volume of public comments, and referenced the Presi-
dent’s supervisory authority without becoming a mere instru-
ment of his will. 
A court might, of course, find that other important issues of 
economic and political significance were not addressed in the 
rulemaking. Or it might find that traditional principles of statu-
tory construction barred the agency’s interpretation, irrespective 
of the fact that major questions were involved. But the great vir-
tue of using a notice-and-comment rulemaking on such a high-
profile issue is that it is likely that commentators will raise most, 
if not all, relevant issues, and therefore the agency will have a 
legal responsibility to address them. The focus of judicial review 
of such major regulatory cases should be on ensuring that the 
agency forthrightly engaged with the relevant policy questions, 
rather than presuming that the court is competent to resolve 
these questions without according institutional respect to the 
agency’s deliberative engagement with the President and the af-
fected public. 
King v. Burwell offers a starkly different case.390 There, the 
IRS had promulgated a regulation which curtly responded to 
some commenters’ arguments that the language of the Afforda-
ble Care Act limits health care tax credits to those who enrolled 
on State Exchanges.391 In a single paragraph, the IRS simply 
asserted that the statutory language supported the interpreta-
tion that tax credits were also available on federal exchanges, 
and that the legislative history “does not demonstrate that Con-
gress intended to limit the premium tax credit to State Ex-
changes.”392 The IRS concluded that its proposed interpretation 
was “consistent with the language, purpose, and structure of . . . 
the Affordable Care Act as a whole.”393  
These statements are conclusory. The IRS did not actually 
offer an argument on the major issue the Court subsequently ad-
dressed, namely whether the statutory purpose or scheme re-
quired the availability of tax credits on federal as well as state 
exchanges. Given that the IRS did not engage in a substantive 
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discussion of the policy questions implicated by one of the “Act’s 
key reforms,”394 it was appropriate for the Court not to defer to 
the agency’s interpretation of the statutory ambiguity. Had the 
IRS considered the policy implications of reserving subsidies for 
state exchanges alone; had it offered a detailed discussion of the 
purpose of the ACA in light of its overall structure and its legis-
lative history; had it acknowledged background concerns of eco-
nomic liberty and federalism that had arguably animated the 
King litigation; in that case, the Court ought to have deferred to 
the IRS’s interpretation. But the rule has much more the quality 
of an interstitial exercise in gap-filling than an engagement over 
disputed issues of policy. In other words, the meaning of this pro-
vision might have indeed become “a case for the IRS,”395 but the 
IRS did not in fact demonstrate, on the record, the degree of de-
liberative attention that would have merited judicial deference 
to its resolution of the major question. 
Similarly, in Texas v. United States, the Obama Administra-
tion promulgated the DAPA program not through rulemaking 
but through an enforcement memorandum.396 The agency did 
not document any kind of robust public consultation process that 
would have indicated deliberative-democratic engagement over 
the shift in immigration policy. DHS’s failure to record any such 
procedure undermined its democratic authority to undertake a 
significant policy shift without explicit congressional authoriza-
tion. This does not mean that the Fifth Circuit was correct that 
the Department’s interpretation of the law was invalid. It simply 
means that a reviewing court would have no good reason to defer 
to DHS’s interpretation of the INA under these circumstances. 
This approach might also help to adjudicate the dispute be-
tween dissenting and concurring opinions in United Telecomm. 
Recall that Judge Kavanaugh and Judge Brown argued in dis-
sent that the Open Internet Order was unlawful because there 
was no express statutory authority for the regulation of Internet 
service providers as common carriers.397 The concurrence argued 
that the statute was ambiguous and permitted the FCC’s inter-
pretation.398 In addition, the concurrence gestured at the ex-
traordinary level of engagement with the Commission’s process, 
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noting that “[t]he FCC received the views of some four million 
commenters before adopting the rule.”399 In the approach I have 
proposed, the extraordinary number of public comments would 
provide evidence that issues of great political moment were im-
plicated by the order. The court could therefore grant Judge Ka-
vanaugh’s point that the interpretation at issue was a major 
one—implicating considerable economic issues as well as public 
interests like open and equal access to means of political com-
munication and debate—but then evaluate the quality of the 
rulemaking record to see if these kinds of concerns had been dis-
cussed with reasonable discernment by the FCC. The court 
would not consider whether the Commission’s discussion of the 
values implicated was, by the court’s own lights, right or wrong, 
but only whether it had engaged with any serious moral and eco-
nomic arguments raised in the rulemaking in a more than rote 
and perfunctory manner. 
Under the approach I am advancing here, it does not matter 
whether such a major policy decision is categorized by the agency 
as an enforcement memorandum, a rule, or a general statement 
of policy. If an administrative policy is promulgated under any 
of these headings, and a court determines that the policy shift 
implicates a question of deep economic and political significance, 
the agency must have documented a value-oriented process of 
public engagement for its interpretations of statutory ambigui-
ties to qualify for judicial deference. 
  CONCLUSION   
Major questions will continue to surface regularly in admin-
istrative activity. Under the Trump Administration, administra-
tive agencies are working with vigor to reverse many of the pol-
icies implemented under the previous Administration. For 
example, agencies under the Trump Administration have re-
scinded the Obama Administration’s deferred action programs 
for undocumented immigrants,400 proposed to rescind the 2015 
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Clean Water Rule,401 and reevaluated rules regulating for-profit 
educational institutions402 and campus sexual assault and har-
assment.403 Judges can find, and indeed have found,404 questions 
of deep economic and political significance in such regulatory ac-
tions without much difficulty. When they do so, they should take 
care to observe the basic deliberative principles that legitimate 
administrative activity in our Progressive state. They should not 
reflexively assume that the implication of such value choices pre-
cludes deference to the agency, and permits the court itself to 
determine the issue de novo without any solicitude for adminis-
trative judgment. Nor, however, should they end their inquiry at 
the finding of a statutory ambiguity and a delegation of lawmak-
ing authority to an administrative agency. Instead, courts 
should only defer to the agency if the agency has reached its in-
terpretation through an open, inclusive, and rational discussion 
of the policy choices at issue. They should not defer to hastily 
drafted and nonconsultative declarations that have failed to en-
gage the considered judgment of the persons they affect or re-
spond to their concerns in a reasoned fashion. In this way, courts 
can respect the institutional competence of agencies to interpret 
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public purposes, without abdicating their responsibility to en-
sure that We the People retain authorship over the rules that 
bind us. 
